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THE HIGH COST OF LOW SANCTIONS
Irina D. Manta*
Abstract
Low sanctions can initially appear to be a mitigating factor for unjust
or inefficient laws, but this perception is likely wrong. This Article
argues that low sanctions may have a pernicious effect on the
democratic process and on legislative rule making because, as both
public choice theory and historical precedent suggest, the laws
accompanying these sanctions are more likely to perpetuate themselves
and become part of the unquestioned background fabric of society. This
Article focuses on intellectual property law (in particular, copyright)
and examines the progression of suboptimal laws through widespread
low sanctions that may mostly escape the public eye until sanctions then
grow to more significant size. In intellectual property, as elsewhere,
low-level sanctions coupled with problematic laws are less likely than
their high-sanction counterparts to attract the attention of the media and
lead to political action. This Article makes several claims about low
sanctions. The first is that low sanctions increase the likelihood that a
problematic law will be passed. Second, low sanctions decrease the
odds that such a law will be repealed. Third, unjust laws with low
sanctions bear the risk that the sanctions will (sometimes gradually)
rise, and thus reduce any upsides that accompany the initial low level of
the sanctions. By the time this occurs, it may prove an irreversible
change because it is more difficult to abolish a law than to prevent its
initial passage. The media plays a key role in these processes when it
focuses on the identifiable victims of high sanctions and fails to pay
attention to the statistical victims of low sanctions. Last, whether
sanctions for single offenses are high or low, prosecutors can
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accumulate counts in a way that significantly intimidates alleged
offenders with sometimes dramatic consequences. This practice was
visible in the recent stories about computer coder and Internet activist
Aaron Swartz’s prosecution and suicide. Examples from intellectual
property and other legal areas should encourage us to take a closer look
at existing or proposed legislation that appears harmless enough at first
glance due to its low sanctions or lack of enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
At first blush, low sanctions can appear to be a mitigating factor for
unjust or inefficient laws, but this perception is likely wrong. This
Article argues that low sanctions have a pernicious effect on the
democratic process and on legislative rule making. Both public choice
theory and historical precedent demonstrate that, even when they
accompany unjust laws, such sanctions are likely to perpetuate
themselves and become part of the unquestioned background fabric of
society. In short, there are few popular uprisings and little lobbying
activity for change because of inappropriate $100 fines. While the
injustice or disutility that any individual suffers from a low unwarranted
sanction is relatively small, the aggregate effect could prove
dangerously problematic, to the point of adding up to a greater overall
injustice or reduction in utility than a high sanction would induce.
Indeed, in some instances we may find ourselves more disturbed by the
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knowledge that 1,000 individuals paid an unfair $200 fine (collectively
paying $200,000) than that one individual paid an undue $10,000 fine.1
The $200 fines, however, make for boring press. Therefore, the media
leaves the public unaware of the problem, whereas the larger the unjust
sanction is, the likelier the media is to publicize the story and the
likelier it is that the public and, as a result, lawmakers will pay attention
to it, which is usually the first step toward changing a law.
What compounds the problem of selective popularization of stories
in the media is many people’s bias toward caring about the fate of
specific, concrete human lives (also known as identifiable lives) much
more than about the fate of statistical lives.2 Hence, even in a world in
which everyone accepts a utilitarian framework to view the law, people
will show excessive concern for named individual victims of unjust
laws over statistical victims. Because of this phenomenon, even if
society is theoretically aware that large numbers of people suffer from
low sanctions, it is unlikely to develop a strong sense of indignation.
Were the media to cover a few of these people’s stories, this would only
begin to scratch the surface, and most individuals whom the sanctions
affect would remain statistical regardless, which would trigger a much
reduced level of outrage. Viewed mathematically, a newspaper story
that discusses the $200 fines levied against five individuals will still add
up to a total of only $1,000 brought to the public’s attention—a mere
pittance in comparison to the single $10,000 fine. And this calculation
makes the presumption that individuals are necessarily able to recognize
and understand collective disutility in such a way that it affects their
decision-making.
Public choice theory teaches us that political action is unlikely when
the costs of the status quo are widely distributed, so the individuals who
pay the $200 fines are unlikely to organize collectively because each
has only a small stake in the matter and the transaction costs of
organization are high.3 The public at large may not take action because
each individual is relatively unafraid to face the risk of paying a $200
fine at some point in her life even if the probability of doing so is high,
and she therefore views the certain cost of political involvement as
excessive in comparison with the chance of facing a small unjust fine.4
1. This is reminiscent of scammers that are difficult to uncover because they only take a
few cents each from large numbers of individuals. I would like to thank Professor Rebecca
Tushnet for her comments on this point.
2. See discussion of statistical versus identifiable lives infra Section I.C.
3. For a discussion of this type of collective action problem in the political context, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 58 (1965).
4. In this example, one could argue that for some individuals of very low socioeconomic
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If neither the individuals who may or do face low sanctions nor those
who watch others receive unjust low sanctions will take action (or if
that latter group of watchers never exists given the absence of media
coverage), then the legislative status quo is likely to persist.
This Article makes several claims about low sanctions. The first is
that low sanctions increase the likelihood that an unjust law will be
passed. Second, low sanctions decrease the odds that such a law will be
repealed. Third, an additional risk of unjust laws with low sanctions is
that the sanctions will (sometimes progressively) rise and thus reduce
any upsides that accompany the initial low level of the sanctions. By the
time this occurs, it may prove an irreversible change because it is more
difficult to abolish a law than to prevent its initial passage. Fourth,
whether sanctions are high or low, prosecutors can often bring multiple
counts against individuals for a single offense, and thus create large
threats to those individuals’ futures in a manner the statutes’ drafters
probably failed to consider. This practice was apparent in the
prosecution and suicide at age twenty-six of computer coder and
Internet activist Aaron Swartz, who was charged with thirteen criminal
counts that added up to a theoretical total of thirty-five years in prison
for hacking into MIT’s network to download and release a large amount
of articles from an academic database.5 His story also provides an
example for my claim that a known individual victim, especially a highprofile one, can prove key to encouraging discourse about legal changes
and increase the likelihood of implementing them.
After presenting the general case for the dangers that lie in low
sanctions for unjust laws, this Article turns its attention to several
diverse areas that exemplify the previously described trends. These
areas include criminal laws prohibiting marijuana and sodomy and,
most relevantly, intellectual property infringement such as some forms
of copyright infringement. The argument focuses especially on the
evolution toward higher sanctions that encountered successful resistance
only after (1) the courts asked infringers to pay hundreds of thousands
of dollars or the government threatened them with extradition, and
(2) the threat of prison and other repercussions for actions such as the
unauthorized streaming of illegal content led to significant media and
individual responses. The examples from copyright law illustrate the
cautionary tale that laws with low sanctions provide. They should also
encourage individuals to take a closer look at existing and proposed
legislation that appears harmless enough at first glance, be it in
intellectual property or other areas of law.
status, a $200 fine is not insignificant. These same individuals, however, are unlikely to wield
political power in most instances.
5. See infra Section II.C.
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This Article begins in Part I with an examination of how the side
effects of low sanctions in legislation differ from those of high
sanctions, what the consequences of unenforced laws can be, and how
the media contributes to individuals’ bias toward causes that involve
high sanctions. Part II shows how the principles that Part I demonstrates
have played out in the area of offenses against intangible property, and
particularly in the contexts of copyright statutory sanctions, the
downfall of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act
(PIPA), and the prosecution of Aaron Swartz. Part III is the conclusion.
I. THE EFFECT OF LOW SANCTIONS
This Part illustrates several points about low sanctions through
examples from a variety of legal contexts. First, it shows how low
sanctions promote the enactment of unjust laws and make it more
difficult to repeal them. Second, it demonstrates the dangers of low
sanctions observable through the resistance to change of unenforced or
other unpopular laws. Third, this Part elucidates how the media’s focus
on identifiable victims at the expense of statistical ones exacerbates the
fact that, to society’s detriment, people generally pay insufficient
attention to laws that impose low sanctions.
A. Enacting and Repealing Legislation
After legislators propose a bill at the federal or state level, passage
most basically requires that a majority of the people’s representatives
vote in favor of it. But what motivates a representative to vote in a
particular way? The numerous factors affecting such decisions include
the sentiments of the representative’s constituents, the level of financial
contributions tied to a piece of legislation, the prominence of the
representative(s) who propose the legislation, and the media’s attitude
toward the legislation as well as the level of coverage that it gives to a
specific bill. This Article argues that if the goal is to pass a law that a
significant portion of the population will view as unjust or inefficient,
then lower sanctions will prove strategically useful in many situations.
As a corollary, the existence of low sanctions will make it more difficult
for opponents to effectuate the repeal of existing laws. This is true both
of laws that are considered unjust regardless of the level of sanctions
and of those that will only be viewed as unjust if their sanctions rise to a
particular level over time.
This Article’s use of the terms “high” versus “low” with regard to
sanctions is fairly loose, in part because sanctions lie on a spectrum that
has neither clear cut-off points nor entirely neat categories. Hence, this
Article does not draw an artificial bright line between the two.
Generally speaking, civil fines that represent a small percentage of most
people’s income usually qualify as “low.” Large civil fines and many
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criminal sanctions fall into the “high” designation. It is also important to
recognize the distinction between possible sanctions on the books and
sanctions as enforced. The level of either can affect public attitudes
about pending or enacted legislation depending on the circumstances.6
A number of this Article’s claims should thus be viewed as comparing
relatively higher to relatively lower sanctions in their respective effects.
The distinctions between the levels include elements such as the type of
sanctions (e.g., civil versus criminal), the height of the sanctions in the
law as written, the likely height of the sanctions in the law as applied, as
well as individuals’ likely subjective experiences of different types and
heights of sanctions, among other factors.
This Article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive definition
of what makes a law unjust or inefficient. Indeed, for purposes of this
Article, it is presumed that such laws are simply those which large
numbers of the voting public perceive to be more disadvantageous than
advantageous. Or, to put it differently, this involves laws that society
likely would not have supported at the time of passage if it (1) had been
aware of them and (2) understood how they would be implemented.7
Therefore, one could say that this Article examines how to best
minimize outcomes that are undemocratic over the long run. This
Article will not reiterate or reanalyze the existing general arguments
about the ability of the public choice framework to explain individual
versus collective behavior.8 Rather, this Article specifically analyzes
how the level of sanctions changes behaviors if the foundations of that
model are taken as given, and to what extent the media influences the
degree of political involvement with high versus low sanctions.
6. Most of the time, the relevant total punishment (P) consists of the maximum possible
sanction for an offense (S) times the odds of enforcement (O) and multiplied by the discount
value of the actual punishment that a court imposes (DV), as follows: P = S x O x DV. It is
noteworthy that the same value of P will not necessarily have the same effect on all individuals’
behavior and that, at some times, people care more about the level of sanctions while at other
times they care more about the sanctions’ frequency. See, e.g., infra notes 130–34 and
accompanying text.
7. This is not to say that democratic desire always aligns with what one would define as
“just” based on abstract theories of morality, but this Article often uses democratic notions of
justice as a proxy to derive general principles. As all proxies, it is imperfect, but it provides a
number of advantages such as serving the goals of administrability (the extent to which a law
pleases the public is measurable through polls and other tools) and legitimacy (the consent—and
assent—of the governed is of recognized importance to the American legal system even among
individuals who disagree on the relative merits of various abstract moral theories). See generally
Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607 (2000) (advocating for the use of norm-shifting “soft nudges” at times precisely to
pass legislation that would fail if it contained “hard shoves”).
8. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 3, at 57–60 (providing some of the foundational work in
this context).
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One situation particularly prone to allowing for the passage of
suboptimal laws may occur when a single crisis, or one of a few, gives
rise to reactionary legislation. Crises can temporarily crystallize public
sentiment in such a way that the majority of society is either not willing
or not able to forestall sweeping legal changes despite the fact that these
changes, as a whole, go against the overall will of the relevant
population at either the national or local level. The immediate aftermath
of crises can bring about a potentially dangerous combination of
heightened public emotions, the real or perceived need to pass
legislation quickly, a willingness to exchange substantive liberties and
procedural rights for perceived safety, and political opportunism.9 One
example where these factors possibly combined was the passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act) after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Commentators noted a number of years after the
attacks that many Americans “have accepted possible privacy intrusions
at times of national crisis—but not on an unlimited or permanent basis.
As the immediacy of the sense of crisis wanes, interest in privacy rights
can reassert itself.”10 While the likelihood that many (and perhaps most)
legislators who voted in favor of the Patriot Act failed to read the text of
the bill11 does not, in itself, authoritatively put the law into the
suboptimal category, it does cast a shadow on the Act’s legitimacy.12
This piece of evidence also shows the strength of the effect of crisis on
lawmaking, as Congress fears a much greater backlash if it fails to act
9. See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark 4–5 (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 442, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974148 (“For
a legislator, ‘doing something’ in response to a crisis is both easier to explain to anxious
constituents, and more likely to be positively reported in the media, than inaction, and therefore
it would appear to be a clear-cut superior route to reelection, which is the posited focus of
legislators.”). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the
Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1643
(2009) (providing a more complex picture of crisis legislation that stems from the idea that
“[t]he basic dilemma for legislatures is that before a crisis, they lack the motivation and
information to provide for it in advance, while after the crisis has occurred, they have no
capacity to manage it themselves” (emphasis omitted)); Adrian Vermeule, Emergency
Lawmaking After 9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1155 (2008) (“[T]he circumstances of
emergency lawmaking do not create a systematic tilt towards increasing executive power
beyond the point that a rational legislature would specify.”).
10. Gary Langer, Poll: Support Seen for Patriot Act, ABC NEWS (June 9, 2005),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/PollVault/story?id=833703#.UNOAom80WSo. For a discussion and
proposals about how to achieve a sensible trade-off between safety and liberty, see generally
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE
(2004).
11. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 267 (2007).
12. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L. REV. 135,
141, 148 (2011) (arguing that legislators have a duty to read bills before voting to pass them).
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rapidly than if it fails to act optimally.13
In the face of the great forces present after crises, only a massive and
concerted public outcry can stop inefficient laws or even moderately
reshape them. Some factors that may determine the level of outcry
include the particular area of legislation that a law involves, a bill’s
level of perceived injustice, the level of media scrutiny, and the amount
of resources available to the outraged individuals. For several of these
factors, the level of sanctions is likely to have a direct or indirect effect
on the degree of outcry that results. As this Article mentions in the
Introduction, high sanctions make for better media stories. This is true
not only for implemented laws, but also for the stimulation of the
public’s imagination and emotions about a proposed bill. It is helpful to
envision the following matrix that depicts part of the relationship
between public sentiment and sanctions. Each row depicts a different
level of perceived “pure” injustice, which means injustice as defined
before lawmakers apportion any sanctions for an offense.14 As
previously mentioned, this Article mainly uses democratic
understandings of justice, and these could entail public perceptions that
the crime is unjust in substance or that its enforcement entails
13. For one historical account of the passage of the Patriot Act, see generally Beryl A.
Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145
(2004). The actual effects of the Patriot Act remain in controversy, as some scholars argue that
its downsides have been exaggerated. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the
USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 608 (2003) (arguing that
the Patriot Act did not dramatically expand law enforcement power and made “mostly minor
amendments to the electronic surveillance laws”); see also Eric Posner, There’s Still a Need,
N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/07/dowe-still-need-the-patriot-act/theres-still-a-need-for-the-patriot-act (“As we lose some of our
security, it is natural and proper for government to increase surveillance and other security
measures at the margin, and to some extent the Patriot Act was just making up for lost time.”);
Nathan A. Sales, A Vital Weapon, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011, 11:54 AM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/07/do-we-still-need-the-patriot-act/the-patriotact-is-a-vital-weapon-in-fighting-terrorism (arguing that the Patriot Act remains a key tool in the
fight against terrorism). Meanwhile, other scholars state that “[f]rom the beginning, Democratic
and Republican critics of the Patriot Act warned that its extraordinary surveillance powers
would be used to investigate political dissent or low-level offenses rather than terrorism. And
their fears were soon vindicated.” Jeffrey Rosen, Too Much Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011,
11:54 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/07/do-we-still-need-the-patriotact/the-patriot-act-gives-too-much-power-to-law-enforcement. See generally SUSAN N.
HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2011) (compiling civil liberties violations since the events of September 11, 2001).
14. It is understood that the level of sanctions then also affects the perceived justice of a
bill. One of the starkest illustrations of this principle is enshrined in the Eighth Amendment,
which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” with the understanding that a law that is
otherwise legitimate can become illegitimate if it crosses a certain threshold of harshness. See
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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unacceptable discriminatory aspects.15 Meanwhile, the columns in the
following table delineate the level of sanctions:

High injustice
Low injustice

High sanctions

Low sanctions

Likely outrage

Possible outrage

Possible outrage Unlikely outrage

While outrage is still possible in the low-sanctions scenario, it is not
as likely as in the high-sanctions scenario. Indeed, there are cases in
which the level of sanctions makes the marginal difference as to
(1) whether there is outrage or (2) what the level of outrage is. This
determines whether groups mobilize on particular issues, how much
money individuals and groups spend on issues, and so on.
In some situations, legislators have clear incentives to set sanctions
high when they draft and pass bills. For example, they may want to
show that they are “tough on crime” and that they take an appropriately
stern stance against terrorists.16 In other cases, however, the sanctions
that the problematic laws include are low or even nonexistent. An
example might include a law that seeks to expand a specific national or
local executive power with murky consequences rather than create a
new offense type. These cases are more likely to create an impression
that, while a law may seem dubious in other ways, the harm to any of
the victims of its inherent injustice is not egregious enough to warrant
the requisite investment for an effective public outcry. The government
also has other incentives to exercise some degree of moderation in
setting punishments, and its rent-seeking nature may lead to the creation
of “enforcement and punishment with the goal of appropriating the rents
of the criminal market. Deterrence is still relevant in this context,
although, paradoxically, it is something that often impedes the
government’s objective. When high probabilities of detection and high
fines deter offenses too much, revenue from fines goes down.”17 One
consideration in the passage of laws is that the government must expend
resources on enforcement, so fines of various forms can prove more
15. See supra note 7.
16. Indeed, sometimes legislators or constituents do not perceive a law with low sanctions
as important, which could present an impediment to its passage. See Rachel E. Barkow,
Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1277–78 (2005) (arguing
that the “tough-on-crime” language irrationally tends to lead only to harsher sanctions because
any alternative would be perceived as “soft on crime”).
17. Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking
Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 117 (2002).
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lucrative than punishments like incarceration or probation.18
It bears mention that repealing laws tends to be at least as difficult as
passing them.19 Indeed, it is most likely quite a bit harder to repeal a law
than to block its initial passage, in part because the public becomes
more indifferent to even constitutional violations once these violations
gain status as “the new normal.” One of the reasons it is so difficult to
study the number of laws that legislators repeal each year is that a repeal
often takes the form of the passage of a different bill. Further, many
legislators modify laws rather than eliminate them altogether, so the
development of a metric as to what constitutes a genuine repeal is
extremely difficult. It is clear, however, that more laws are enacted
yearly than are removed.20 This fact could stem from the positive effects
that many laws bring—the idea being that there are more laws because
they benefit society, which would make repeal undesirable—but this is
far from certain.
One extreme example of the difficulties that the repeal process
involves is the prohibition of alcohol in the United States. The
prohibition wrought disastrous consequences before it could be
abolished, such as the rise of the Mafia, widespread corruption, and
extensive inequality of enforcement between socioeconomic classes.21
Not only that, but the federal government, tasked primarily with the
protection of citizens, may have purposefully poisoned alcohol during
that period and killed at least 10,000 individuals who imbibed the
substance.22 While most examples do not entail such dramatic
consequences, on balance it seems reasonable to move forward with the
assumption that repeal is generally at least as difficult as initial passage
18. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 179–80 (1968).
19. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1573, 1606 n.146 (2007) (“[F]ederal lawmaking procedures make it difficult not only to
adopt, but to repeal federal law. The Founders recognized this danger, but thought that Congress
could draft around it if necessary.” (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 587 (comments of James Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
20. State legislatures alone passed 29,000 new laws in 2012, the vast majority of which
are unlikely to constitute “repeals” of other laws in any meaningful sense. See Yamiche
Alcindor, More than 400 New Laws Take Effect Tuesday, USA TODAY (Dec. 31, 2012 11:10
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/29/new-laws-in-2013/1797249/.
21. See, e.g., THOMAS R. PEGRAM, BATTLING DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY
AMERICA, 1800–1933, at 174–75 (1998) (describing the resulting corruption and violence during
the Prohibition era). Meanwhile, the “War on Drugs” of other sorts continues despite what some
view as its far-reaching negative effects. For a discussion of marijuana laws in the context of the
difficulty of changing relatively unpopular laws, see Section I.B.
22. Deborah Blum, The Chemist’s War, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2010, 10:00 AM),
http://beta.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2010/02/the_chemists_war.
html.
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and probably more so.23
The factors that affect outrage during repeal resemble those during
initial passage, except that low sanctions may prove even more
pernicious in that context. The passage of a new bill yields some natural
media attention and public reaction, while a law that sits on the books
requires a greater amount of energy for any public reaction to gain
momentum. One factor that facilitates repeal of a suboptimal law
compared to passage is that there is time for individual stories to
develop about the people who experienced negative effects such as
unjust sanctions. Nevertheless, these stories are more likely to appear
and to make an impression if they involve high sanctions.
B. The Lowest Sanction of Them All: Nonenforcement?
This section shows how unenforced laws, which imply sanctions of
zero, can still have uniquely pernicious effects.24 It also discusses how
both unenforced and generally unpopular laws can persist in the face of
large-scale criticism.25 Some of the concerns behind unenforced laws
gave rise to the doctrine of desuetude, which allows for the judicial
abrogation of laws that have not been enforced for a long time. This
doctrine, however, is officially recognized only in West Virginia among
American jurisdictions.26 An interesting example in the context of
nonenforcement is sodomy laws. While sodomy laws carried high
sanctions on the books of many states in the past,27 in practice the
average person “guilty” of acts of sodomy rarely suffered any official
sanctions even before courts declared the laws unconstitutional.28 This
23. The treatment of marijuana legislation is instructive in this respect. See Section I.B.
24. This section does not imply that it is necessarily optimal to enforce every law at all
times. Frequently, there is space for a sensible buffer for minor infractions, and perfect
enforcement is prohibitively expensive in any case, among other problems.
25. Some argue that not all laws need to be popular and that, occasionally, legislatures
should shape preferences rather than perpetuate them. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1.
While this may prove true under some circumstances, American government is generally
understood as one that seeks to respect and enforce the democratic will.
26. Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209 (2006). Whether more jurisdictions
should recognize desuetude has been a question for lively scholarly debate. See id. at 2209–10
nn.4 & 6 (referencing sources arguing both sides of the question).
27. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA
1861–2003, at 388–407 app. (2008).
28. In fact, Professor Cass Sunstein believes that the Lawrence v. Texas decision that
declared sodomy laws unconstitutional “is best understood as responsive to what the Court saw
as an emerging national awareness, reflected in a pattern of nonenforcement, that it is
illegitimate to punish people because of homosexual conduct—and that the decision therefore
embodies a kind of American-style desuetude.” Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 45 (2003). The impact
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was likely known at the time when new laws of this sort were passed
and increases the understanding that legislators mainly wanted to scare
and send a symbolic message to persons engaged in acts of sodomy
rather than directly punish them for their behavior. Indeed, Professor
William Eskridge explains that “police rarely enforced sodomy laws
against anyone before 1880, even when such illegal activities were
notorious in the community,”29 and “sodomy laws were understood, in
the nineteenth century, primarily as instruments to regulate sexual
assault.”30 This pattern changed somewhat for a period of time,
however, when states expanded the scope of these laws to include oral
sex, and the number of arrests for sodomy greatly increased.31 Once
sodomy laws were no longer enforced due to changing mores, they still
created numerous problems. For one, individuals who were previously
prosecuted continued to bear significant stigma as registered sex
offenders despite the fact that their consensual homosexual acts took
place potentially dozens of years earlier.32 Professor William Stuntz
also notes that for crimes of vice, enforcement must necessarily be
selective because it is impossible to police all such behavior.33 As a
result, who gets caught is largely a function of where the police decide
to investigate.34 While the law itself may not specifically discriminate
against particular people, police and prosecutors can choose their
targets, which may lead to more unfairness when the choices depend on
specific attributes of offenders such as race or class.35 Even after
that Lawrence will have on some other generally unenforced criminal laws in the area of sexual
relationships, such as those pertaining to adultery, remains uncertain. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose,
Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531, 543 (1995) (describing the status of
criminal laws against adultery historically and in modern America); Gabrielle Viator, Note, The
Validity of Criminal Adultery Prohibitions After Lawrence v. Texas, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
837, 845, 851–61 (2006) (discussing the possible effects of Lawrence on criminal laws against
adultery and stating that they remain on the books in close to half of all American states).
29. ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 21; see also RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY
OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 51 n.9 (1988) (“Sodomy laws are very rarely enforced against
consenting adults in clearly private environs.”).
30. ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 20.
31. Id. at 55–56; see also JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE
MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970, at 49–51 (1983)
(describing arrests and police harassment of homosexual individuals in the 1950s).
32. Robert L. Jacobson, “Megan’s Laws” Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay Police
Harassment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2431, 2460 (1999). These examples also show how laws that are
generally no longer enforced can still interact with laws that are enforced (such as registration
for sex offenders) and have a negative effect on the lives of those who violate the unenforced
laws. See id.
33. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1875 (2000).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1880.
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criminal prosecutions ceased, sodomy laws continued to stigmatize
homosexual individuals and kept them worried that any sexual
encounter could suddenly result in criminal penalties.36
While some of the concerns that result from nonenforcement are
unique to the context of sodomy laws, other issues that relate to
nonenforcement arise generally. As Christopher Leslie states:
“Unenforced laws need not be repealed, the argument goes, because
they are harmless. Unfortunately, this reasoning can lull legislators and
the electorate into unwarranted complacency.”37 A person’s knowledge
that she is committing an illegal act often produces some degree of fear
and anxiety. It potentially exacerbates her relations with law
enforcement and leads to avoidance behaviors that could put her at risk
of various harms. For example, many people (in fact, quite possibly the
majority of Americans)38 would place smoking marijuana in the
category of behaviors that should not lead to legal sanctions. Currently,
a victim of a violent crime who was smoking marijuana at the time of
the incident is probably less likely to contact the police, even if she
experiences continued risk of some level of bodily harm and although
the odds of a marijuana-related prosecution of such a victim are likely
low.39 The risk of underreporting in such situations may be heightened
36. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 128 (2000) (noting that despite
the modern assumption “that the abuses of the 1950s and 1960s are relics, the persecution of gay
people continues today”). For a discussion and empirical study related to the social effects of
criminal sodomy laws in South Africa, see generally Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement
Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643 (2001).
37. Leslie, supra note 36, at 103.
38. In a recent poll, 58% of Americans were in favor of the legalization of pot nationwide
and 39% were in favor of keeping it illegal. Ariel Edwards-Levy, Pot Legalization Support at
Record High, Poll Finds, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 4, 2012 5:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/04/pot-legalization_n_2240257.html. Other figures
suggest that nine out of ten adults in the United States believe that people who possess or
consume small amounts of marijuana should not go to jail, and 85% of polled voters support
therapeutic use of marijuana. See Allen St. Pierre & Paul Armentano, Americans Agree:
Marijuana
Shouldn’t
Be
Criminalized,
CNN
(Aug.
12,
2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/09/opinion/st-pierre-armentano-marijuana/index.html.
39. This is particularly disconcerting in light of the fact that in 2003, as many as 18% of
the urine samples that rape treatment centers across the United States submitted for testing in
cases of suspected drug-facilitated rape tested positive for marijuana, which suggests a fairly
large involvement for marijuana even for cases that went through some form of reporting. See
Erica Weir, Drug-Facilitated Date Rape, 165 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 80, 80 (2001) (providing
statistics regarding drug-facilitated rape). Criminals sometimes prey specifically on individuals
that they believe are less likely to turn to the police. See, e.g., Jordan Blair Woods, Comment,
Taking the “Hate” out of Hate Crimes: Applying Unfair Advantage Theory to Justify the
Enhanced Punishment of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 489, 490 & n.1 (2008)
(discussing robberies targeting homosexual men who sought out sex in public parks).
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for populations that already fear the police.40
The ban on smoking marijuana represents a good example of how
difficult it can be to change relatively unpopular laws, especially federal
ones. Forty-two percent of American survey respondents reported that
they had tried marijuana at least once, which represents double the
percentage of that present in the more permissive Netherlands and may
still underestimate the real figure.41 The explanations for this disparity
between countries are manifold, but one factor may be the reactionary
posture of individuals who face laws that they consider unjust.42
America has had a complex relationship with marijuana. At times, parts
of the country encouraged or mandated the production of hemp, but
then later initiated state efforts to declare the drug illegal due to its
association with socially deviant behaviors and with feared Mexican
immigrants. Eventually the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act effectively
declared the substance illegal.43 This law included sentences of up to
$2,000 or five years in prison for certain types of marijuana handling.44
The sanctions against the use of marijuana rose to a minimum sentence
of two to ten years with a fine of up to $20,000 in the 1950s. While
legislators lifted this type of mandatory sentence in the 1970s, the AntiDrug Abuse Act enacted in the 1980s included other mandatory sections
that eventually included a “three strikes and you’re out” provision,
requiring life sentences for repeat drug offenders of some types.45 The
number of arrests for marijuana rose from a rate of about two an hour in
1966 to over eighty an hour in the current era, the equivalent of around

40. A number of studies have examined fear of the police and tried to understand the
factors that contribute to this sentiment. See, e.g., Avdi S. Avdija, The Role of Police Behavior
in Predicting Citizens’ Attitudes Toward the Police, 6 APPLIED PSYCHOL. CRIM. JUST. 76 (2010),
available at http://www.apcj.org/documents/6_2_AvdijaArticle.pdf (stating that police behavior
is the largest determinant of citizens’ attitudes toward the police and that citizens’ demographic
characteristics are the second largest).
41. Louisa Degenhardt et al., Towards a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis, and
Cocaine Use: Findings from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED.
1053, 1057, 1062 (2008).
42. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1269–70
(2011) [hereinafter Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash] (mentioning the war on soft drugs,
Prohibition laws, and excessive measures against tax evasion as examples of backfiring
policies); see also Stuntz, supra note 33, at 1872 (explaining that criminalization can achieve the
opposite of its intended effect and undermine the norms it seeks to promote).
43. Marijuana Timeline, PBS: FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/dope/etc/cron.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
44. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551, 556.
45. Marijuana Timeline, supra note 43. For an explanation of how the Anti-Abuse Act
works in practice, see Eric E. Sterling, Drug Laws and Snitching: A Primer, PBS: FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/primer (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
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800,000 arrests a year.46 In 2001, marijuana was the primary drug type
for which judges sentenced 7,758 out of 23,483 offenders (roughly a
third) under the sentencing guidelines for drug trafficking.47 The high
overall rate of arrests and relatively high rate of sentencing for
marijuana offenders is striking when contrasted with public attitudes
about marijuana. When asked whether marijuana should be made legal,
respondents answered “yes” 12% of the time in 1969 and 50% in 2011,
with a progression toward “yes” in a virtually linear fashion during the
years in-between.48 Strikingly, there were roughly half as many arrests
for marijuana offenses in the 1970s as there are now even though
(1) twice as many people want to make marijuana legal today,49 and
(2) there are about as many new users of marijuana every year now as
there were in the 1970s.50 While there are a number of different factors
that may help to explain these statistics, it appears that, overall,
marijuana laws have experienced both absolute and relative increases in
enforcement of various sorts despite a potential disconnection between
these laws and the popular will. Dan Kahan’s explanation for the history
of marijuana laws is that initially the public supported their tough
regulation because the existing laws were unable to inhibit the drug
trade and politicians exploited the increasing fear of drugs.51 At the
same time, given that “individuals’ condemnation preferences are not
46. Paul Armentano, Incarceration Nation—Marijuana Arrests for Year 2009 Near
Record High, NORML (Sept. 15, 2010), http://blog.norml.org/2010/09/15/incarceration-nationmarijuana-arrests-for-year-2009-near-record-high. There are also allegations of vast racial
disparities in marijuana-related arrests, with African-Americans being at a fourfold risk of arrest
in comparison with Caucasians. See Ian Urbina, Blacks Are Singled Out for Marijuana Arrests,
Federal Data Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/us/
marijuana-arrests-four-times-as-likely-for-blacks.html (noting that African-Americans “were
nearly four times as likely as whites to be arrested on charges of marijuana possession in 2010,
even though the two groups used the drug at similar rates”).
47. Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings About Apprendi,
82 N.C. L. REV. 621, 714 n.414 (2004) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 68 tbl.33 (2001)).
48. HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. AT ALBANY SCH. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl.2.67.2011 (2011),
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2672011.pdf.
49. See id.; Armentano, supra note 46, tbl.
50. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., RESULTS FROM 2001 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: VOLUME 1.
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 44, 45 fig.5.1 (2001), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/
data/nhsda/2k1nhsda/PDF/ch5.pdf. A 2012 study states, however, that about 7.3% of Americans
ages twelve or older reported regular marijuana use, which may represent a slight increase from
2007 when it was 5.8% (though some suggest that this may simply result from more willingness
to report such use). Jen Christensen, Regular Marijuana Use on the Rise, Survey Says, CNN
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/05/health/marijuana-use-rising.
51. Kahan, supra note 7, at 632.
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infinitely adaptable, the steady expansion of criminal punishment at
some point risks triggering a backlash. . . . [When] the law began to be
applied to white middle-class college students, members of the social
mainstream began to object, triggering a self-reinforcing wave of
opposition.”52
There are some reasons to believe that changes to marijuana laws
may finally be on the horizon. In November 2012, after some other
states failed in similar efforts,53 voters in Washington and Colorado
legalized the limited use of recreational marijuana for individuals over
twenty-one years of age,54 which created a conflict with the federal ban
on marijuana.55 This prompted President Barack Obama to openly state:
“[A]s it is, the federal government has a lot to do when it comes to
criminal prosecutions. It does not make sense from a prioritization point
of view to focus on drug users in a state where the state has said that
that’s legal.”56 Legalization advocates hope to expand their victories to
states such as California and Oregon,57 which were among the first to
permit medical marijuana.58 It appears that even though the federal
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., November 6, 2012, General Election Abstract of Votes, OR. SEC’Y OF STATE,
available at http://www.oregonvotes.gov/doc/history/nov62012/G12_Abstract.pdf (last visited
Feb. 26, 2014) (indicating the failure of Measure 80, which would have legalized recreational
marijuana use in Oregon); Official Declaration of the Vote Results on November 2, 2010, State
Ballot Measures, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010general/06-official-declaration.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (discussing the defeat of Measure
19, which would have legalized recreational marijuana use in California).
54. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (legalizing marijuana use for persons twentyone years of age or older in Colorado); November 06, 2012 General Election Results, WASH.
SEC’Y OF STATE, available at http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-502Concerns-marijuana.html (last updated Nov. 27, 2012) (indicating the passage of Measure 502,
which legalized recreational marijuana use in Washington).
55. For a discussion of the federalism issues that the enforcement of drug laws involves,
see generally Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783 (2004).
56. Valerie Richardson, Obama: Marijuana Enforcement Low Priority for Feds, COLO.
OBSERVER (Dec. 14, 2012), http://thecoloradoobserver.com/2012/12/obama-marijuanaenforcement-low-priority; see also Kevin Liptak, Obama Says Marijuana ‘No More Dangerous
than Alcohol,’ CNN (Jan. 19, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/01/19/
obama-says-marijuana-no-more-dangerous-than-alcohol.
57. But see sources cited supra note 53.
58. Alex Dobuzinskis, Pro-Marijuana Campaign Looks Ahead After 2012 Victories,
REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/30/us-usa-marijuanalegalization-idUSBRE8BT09X20121230. For a discussion of the status of medical marijuana,
see generally K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 223–26 (2005); Ruth C. Stern &
J. Herbie DiFonzo, The End of the Red Queen’s Race: Medical Marijuana in the New Century,
27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 673 (2009); see also David Frum, Be Afraid of Big Marijuana, CNN
(Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/10/opinion/frum-big-marijuana-cv (questioning
the validity of the diagnoses of a vast percentage of medical marijuana users).
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government won its legal disputes on medical marijuana and the
Supreme Court agreed that the federal government could make even
medicinal use illegal,59 the Executive Branch may be losing interest in
having fights in states that have declared various forms of marijuana
legal.60 The Obama Administration recently ordered prosecutors to stop
listing drug quantities in indictments for low-level cases to avoid the
imposition of statutory mandatory minimums.61 That being said, the
federal government has remained slow in actually taking marijuanarelated laws off the books, which perpetuates uncertainty and leaves
open the possibility that, at least in some states, offenders could still be
placed in prison for long terms.62
Last, it bears emphasis in this Section that for some offenses, while
no ultimate punishment (and thus completed enforcement) results, an
investigation or arrest—negative events in their own right—may take
place.63 Enforced or not, laws can create a class of people who self59. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding the validity of the federal
Controlled Substances Act and holding that “Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for
medicinal substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs
produced and consumed locally”).
60. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to All U.S. Attorneys 3 (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (noting that in jurisdictions that legalize marijuana in
some form with a system for effective regulation and enforcement, “state and local law
enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing marijuanarelated activity”). See generally Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a
bstract_id=2359685 (arguing that it is unconstitutional for the Executive Branch to
prospectively license prohibited conduct or to cease enforcing, on the basis of policy, federal
laws for entire categories of offenders). Some have proposed that the Executive Branch could at
least have the Drug Enforcement Agency reclassify marijuana so it would no longer qualify as a
Schedule I narcotic. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Obama, Who Evidently Has Not Read the
Controlled Substances Act, Denies that He Has the Power to Reclassify Marijuana,
REASON.COM (Jan. 31, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2014/01/31/obama-whoevidently-has-not-read-the-con.
61. Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-drugsentences.html. But see Ilya Somin, Obama Opposed to Changing Legal Status of Marijuana
“at this Point,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 22, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://www.volokh.com/20
13/08/22/obama-opposed-to-marijuana-legalization-at-this-point (expressing skepticism as to
the steps taken by the Obama Administration with regard to the legalization of marijuana and
stating that federal targeting of medical marijuana use has increased in this Administration).
62. This issue continues to develop, and there is at least some interest in changes on both
sides of the political aisle. See, e.g., David Weigel, Forgive and Forget, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/02/republicans_are_favoring_goi
ng_easy_on_drug_offenders_the_young_gop_leaders.html (discussing the split within the
Republican Party on drug enforcement).
63. Professor Christopher R. Leslie describes in his work on homosexual sodomy laws
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identify as criminals or at least outcasts. This can lead to further
marginalization and to the commission of more serious crimes.64 This
should give observers further pause, and it raises the possibility that
punishment through a suboptimal law could increase the number of
offenses that society wants to minimize. This effect is unlikely to
remain limited to the offenders themselves. It could expand to include
non-offending citizens who still lose respect for the legal system due to
its unjust treatment of the offenders.
C. The Media and the Bias Toward Identifiable Victims
As the Introduction states, the media plays an important role in
shaping public perceptions of the law, in part because it has the power
to turn a statistical victim into an identifiable one. Society is generally a
lot more willing to expend resources to protect identifiable victims than
statistical ones.65 While scholars have proposed different possible
causes for this phenomenon,66 one set of experiments found that “the
how, for instance, “in solicitation cases, the arrest itself is often the intended punishment.”
Leslie, supra note 36, at 128–29.
64. There may be a psychological slippery slope of unethical or illegal behavior. One
study found that the simple act of wearing counterfeit sunglasses led individuals to feel less
authentic and increased the occurrence of unethical behavior on their part as well as their
likelihood to view others as unethical. Francesca Gino et al., The Counterfeit Self: The
Deceptive Costs of Faking It, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 712, 717–18 (2010).
65. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 21 (1978) (noting
that “the United States will spend a million dollars to rescue a single, downed balloonist but will
not appropriate a similar sum to provide shore patrols”); see also Deborah A. Small & George
Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2003) (observing the same phenomenon). Studies on the value of statistical
lives (VSL) also affect regulatory decisions, though there is some debate as to the optimal
calculation mechanisms to do so. See Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting
and the Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1532–33 (2010)
(arguing that the current regulatory use of VSL studies undervalues the amount that people are
willing to pay to prevent mortality risks). There are some situations, however, in which the
identifiable/identified victim is an unsympathetic one, and the public may treat that victim no
better or even worse than a statistical victim. See, e.g., Small & Loewenstein, supra, at 14
(“Victims are victims because they are not responsible for their situation and thus evoke
sympathy and pity. If, instead, a person in need is considered responsible for their adverse
situation, then the resulting emotions might instead be anger and disgust.”) (citation omitted).
66. One of these explanations is that specific examples influence individuals because they
are much more vivid than statistical data. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 44–53 (1980). Another is that
identifiable victims are ones that a particular set of actions definitely hurts, whereas there is no
such guarantee for statistical victims. This phenomenon has been dubbed the “certainty effect.”
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265 (1979) (defining the certainty effect as the phenomenon by which
people “overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely
probable”).
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major cause of the identifiable victim effect is the relative size of the
reference group compared to the number of people at risk. Identified
victims constitute their own reference group, 100% of whom will die if
steps are not taken to save them.”67 Translated into utilitarian terms,
what may happen is that when observers perform a (formal or informal)
cost-benefit analysis in situations that involve identifiable victims, they
tend to focus on only the costs and benefits that pertain to those specific
victims. Professors Arden Rowell and Lesley Wexler explain that some
of these trends of discounting victims at the margin may relate to the
observed phenomenon of “psychic numbing,” which occurs as early as
when observers begin to think about more than a single victim.68
There is no reason to believe that this type of thinking restricts itself
to life or death situations. Most people likely read crime-related news
stories with the implicit question as to whether the outcome was fair.
Was the offender caught, and if so, what sentence did he receive? A
recent tragic example in this context is the gang rape and beating of an
Indian woman on a New Delhi bus and her subsequent death at a
Singapore hospital.69 The media widely reported on her plight, and the
incident led thousands of people to defy a ban on demonstrations and to
protest the Indian government’s ineffectiveness in its prevention and
punishment of the rising number of rapes.70 Victims of rape in India
often do not report the crime because they fear repercussions against
themselves, so perpetrators frequently go unpunished.71 While this is a
long-standing issue in India, it is the individual story of a woman
nicknamed “Damini”—“Lightning” in Hindi—who captured the
attention of not only the nation, but also of international audiences.72
67. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the “Identifiable Victim Effect,”
14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 253 (1997); accord David Fetherstonhaugh et al., Insensitivity
to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
283, 293–95 (1997) (reporting a study in which a majority of respondents exhibited
“psychophysical numbing” and were willing to spend $10 million to save 100,000 lives out of a
pool of 290,000 yet agreed to do so to rescue as few as 9,000 lives out of a pool of 15,000).
68. Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives 13 (Ill. Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 13-42, 2013) (quoting Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and Mass Atrocity, in THE
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed., 2012)), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2240564.
69. CNN Staff, Doctor: Young Woman Gang-Raped in India Dies, CNN (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/28/world/asia/india-rape-victim/index.html.
70. See Vibhuti Agarwal, Delhi Protesters Defy Ban, Clash over Rape Laws,
23,
2012,
6:05
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
WALL ST. J. (Dec.
SB10001424127887323291704578197350453571588 (“The protests reflect the disenchantment
that the country’s young generation feels toward what they see as India’s failure to protect
women’s rights.”).
71. Id.
72. CNN Staff, supra note 69.
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Most major U.S. news outlets featured the developments in the story,
some even on their front pages.73 Publicized high-level harm against
one rape victim thus attracted attention in a way that years of mostly
lower-level yet often still very violent crimes against Indian women
failed to do.74
For most crime cases in the press, there is a perpetrator and a victim,
and the empathy tends to focus on the victim. The reaction is somewhat
different, however, when society considers the crime “victimless” or
where, at least, it is unclear if there was any real harm. In those
situations, the offender can take on the role of victim in the public’s
mind. The literature on identifiable versus statistical victims may
provide a partial explanation of why identifiable and identified highsanctions stories have a greater impact on public policy than the
statistical, albeit at times widespread effect of low sanctions.75 The
tendency of the press to report on stories that involve high sanctions or
high harm both stems from and sharpens the contrast in the level of
attention that people pay to different stories, a phenomenon that occurs
at the potential expense of maximal utility.
An interesting story in this context is that of speeding in
Washington, D.C. Nationwide, 89% of polled American drivers admit
that they have driven faster than the posted speed limit, and 40% state
that they have exceeded the speed limit by over twenty miles per hour.76
As a result, when the level of sanctions for speeding changes, many
73. See, e.g., India Gang-Rape Victim’s Condition Deteriorates, USA TODAY (Dec. 28,
2012, 12:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/12/28/indian-rape-victimsdeteriorates/1796235 (reporting in detail the condition of “Damini”); Heather Timmons &
Sruthi Gottipati, Woman Dies After a Gang Rape that Galvanized India, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/world/asia/condition-worsens-for-victim-of-gangrape-in-india.html (reporting the death of “Damini”). The outrage level increased further when
the sole juvenile defendant in the case received a sentence of only three years in prison. See
Tanvi Sharma & Mark Magnier, Teen Sentenced to Three Years in Prison for Fatal Gang Rape
in India, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-indiarape-20130831,0,5439549.story. The four adult offenders received the death penalty. Harmeet
Shah Singh et al., Court Sentences 4 Men to Death in New Delhi Gang Rape Case, CNN (Sept.
14, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/13/world/asia/india-gang-rape-sentence/index.html.
74. See CNN Staff, supra note 69 (discussing the large number of unpublicized claims).
Another case that surfaced around the same time was that of a seventeen-year-old girl who
committed suicide after her allegations of gang rape were initially disbelieved. Harmeet Shah
Singh & Hilary Whiteman, Indian Girl Commits Suicide over Alleged Gang Rape, CNN (Dec.
30, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/28/world/asia/india-rape-suicide/index.html.
75. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
76. New Allstate Survey Shows Americans Think They Are Great Drivers—Habits Tell a
Different Story, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/newallstate-survey-shows-americans-think-they-are-great-drivers---habits-tell-a-different-story-1265
63103.html.
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Americans tend to feel an effect. The District of Columbia recently
decided to more than double the number of traffic cameras it plans to
employ, a decision that many people met with a groan as it represents
an increase in the sanctions that the average speeder can expect to
suffer.77 Meanwhile, some legislators have proposed reductions in the
maximum fines that speeders must pay.78 While part of these
legislators’ rationale has been to reduce the public perception that the
traffic cameras are a revenue-generating machine rather than a truly
justifiable safety measure,79 increases in the frequency of enforcement
and decreases in sanctions may also cleverly serve as a tool against
social protest of the camera-driven pursuit of speeders.80
There is no definitive assessment about the public’s opinion on
speed limits in various localities, but there is some evidence to suggest
that the public would prefer higher rather than lower limits within a
reasonable range. One possible indicator is individuals’ large-scale
willingness to drive faster than the speed limit,81 although there is a
chance that while they trust their own judgment in choosing to speed,
they do not trust other people’s judgment and thus they do believe in
legal punishment for this activity. Another indication is the opposition
that people can have when a state proposes decreases in the maximum
speed limit, such as in 2008 when Kansas considered decreasing the
limit from seventy to sixty-five miles per hour and found that residents
77. Alan Blinder, D.C. Traffic Cameras to More Than Double Amid Record Revenues,
WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 25, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://washingtonexaminer.com/district-trafficcameras-to-more-than-double-amid-record-revenues/article/2516807.
78. Martin Austermuhle, D.C. Legislators Propose Dropping Traffic Camera Fines to
$50, Directing Half of Revenue to Safety Programs, DCIST (Oct. 16, 2012, 10:00 AM),
http://dcist.com/2012/10/dc_legislators_propose_dropping_tra.php.
79. See id. (quoting Councilmember Tommy Wells who stated: “Most people I talk to are
convinced that our automated traffic enforcement cameras are mostly about raising revenue”);
DC to Add 134 Traffic Cameras, Will More than Double Traffic-Camera Network, MY
FOXDC.COM (updated Jan. 23, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.myfoxdc.com/story/20427813/dcto-add-134-traffic-cameras-will-more-than-double-traffic-camera-network (“[D]etractors say the
cameras are driven more by revenue than public safety.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal,
Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1076 (2001) (discussing, in the context
of traffic cameras in Washington, D.C., the lower need for high fines if technology facilitates
frequent enforcement). For an overview of national use of speed and red light cameras, see
Speed and Red Light Camera Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N (last updated Feb.
2014), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/auto_enforce.html.
80. See generally EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013) (analyzing the drawbacks of attempting to solve all
problems, including legal ones, through technology).
81. See Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1401–02
(2002) (discussing how “[m]any drivers, perhaps most drivers, routinely speed” and that “when
asked, most drivers do not view driving 10 mph over the speed limit as wrong”).
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opposed the change by more than a five-to-one margin.82 Meanwhile,
few complained when Texas recently opened a forty-mile stretch of
highway that has the highest maximum speed limit in the nation at
eighty-five miles per hour.83
Given these examples of public behavior and perception regarding
speed limits, imagine what would have happened if, instead of
announcing a doubling in the number of cameras targeting speeding
(accompanied by a potential reduction in the size of fines), Washington,
D.C. had announced a significant increase in the size of fines. Even if
the latter actually meant a smaller overall reduction in the population’s
available private resources, the odds of public protests would have been
heightened. While the Washington, D.C. area newspapers reported on
the doubling of the number of traffic cameras,84 the tone and amount of
coverage was relatively subdued. There is significant reason to suspect
that high fines would have attracted more calls of injustice and public
opposition. Had police then enforced such sanctions, the media would
have soon featured stories about an outrageous fine that a sympathetic
character who barely exceeded the speed limit had to pay. It is unlikely
that any newspaper would feature a lot of individualized profiles of
those who paid $50 as a result of being caught speeding by the traffic
cameras, regardless of the total size of this group of people.85
II. THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT IN COPYRIGHT AND
RELATED LAWS
Sanctions have played a key role in the history of copyright law, and
this Part analyzes how copyright law exemplifies the principle that once
low sanctions are introduced for an offense, they can grow into large
sanctions through a combination of increases in penalties and
enforcement itself.86 Part II also shows the sanctions/injustice matrix
82. See Scott Rothschild, Public Opinion Largely Against Lower Speed Limits,
LAWRENCE J.-WORLD (Oct. 6, 2008), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2008/oct/06/
public_opinion_largely_against_lower_speed_limits.
83. Ryan Owens & Gina Sunseri, Speeding Through Texas: Going 85 MPH on the
Nation’s Fastest Highway, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/speedingtexas-85-mph-highway-opens/story?id=17549839.
84. See supra notes 77–79.
85. Some of the cities that use traffic cameras have been embroiled in court battles, and a
court recently deemed Cleveland’s program unconstitutional. Alison Grant, Cleveland Traffic
Camera System Unconstitutional, Appellate Court Rules, PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/01/cleveland_traffic_camera_syste.html.
86. Indeed, this principle is not unique to intellectual property. Over the last few decades,
for instance, the federal government has repeatedly increased penalties for white-collar crimes,
which include mail and wire fraud. See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of
Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2008).
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from Section I.A. in action and demonstrates how recent popular and
legislative behavior, in addition to the latest empirical data, suggest that
a step beyond a critical threshold level of sanctions can lead to uprisings
that have legal impact. Last, it illustrates, through the events that
surrounded Aaron Swartz’s legal case and his death, how prosecutors
can stack up counts and intimidate defendants with sanctions that may
exceed the level that legislators and the population at large considered
appropriate when the original related bills were passed.
A. The Evolution of Sanctions in Copyright Law
Having delineated the history of criminal sanctions in copyright law
in past work,87 this Article focuses on only a brief sketch here and says
a few words about civil sanctions. Traditionally, the distinctions
between civil and criminal sanctions are that criminal sanctions
generally impose a higher level of social stigma, can lead to the
temporary or permanent loss of rights such as voting, affect future
employability, erode family structures, and carry more significant
psychological harm to offenders.88 These effects militate for special
attention to new criminal legislation even when it contains low
sanctions, but a number of the phenomena that this Article describes
apply to civil sanctions as well. Furthermore, the distinction between
civil and criminal law is so blurred in a variety of contexts89 that the
possibility of a focus solely on criminal law is precluded.
Over a hundred years passed between the enactment of America’s
first copyright legislation and the implementation of criminal sanctions
for related offenses.90 As time progressed, criminal liability expanded to
more offenses and the sanctions grew in size.91 The expansions and
increases were varied; they extended coverage to sound recordings,
shifted criminal liability from the realm of misdemeanors to felonies,
added infringement against software products, included some types of
87. Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 481–85 (2011).
88. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2005) (discussing the social and psychological effects that a felony
criminal conviction may have on an individual).
89. See id. at 4 n.6 (citing to several sources agreeing with this point).
90. Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of
Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 835, 840 (1999).
91. See Manta, supra note 87, at 481–84 (tracking the history of criminal sanctions for
copyright infringement); Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 780–84 (2001)
(discussing how the “term, scope, and power of copyright law has steadily increased over the
years”).
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not-for-profit infringement, provided for stricter application of
sentencing guidelines, made copyright counterfeiting a racketeering
activity, and increased punishments for repeat copyright infringers,
among other changes.92 The shift from misdemeanor to felony liability
occurred because the motion picture and sound recording industries
successfully lobbied Congress and gained support for the arguments that
civil lawsuits failed to deter sophisticated infringers and that “the
modest penalties prescribed under then-existing law tended to
discourage criminal enforcement efforts. U.S. Attorneys confronted
with a wide range of possible prosecutions clearly preferred the
prospect of almost any felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction
for copyright infringement.”93
For a long time, the trend toward ever-increasing sanctions and
enforcement seemed unstoppable. A combination of factors—including
the perceived need to stop infringers armed with increasingly powerful
technologies and the strong unity among copyright owners who lobbied
for intellectual property maximalism—expanded the boundaries of the
law one bill at a time.94 Why did many individuals fail to stand up to
copyright lobbies until fairly recently if some of these expansions may
not have served the greater good? It is as true in copyright as in other
legal areas that “the rational individual in the large group in a sociopolitical context will not be willing to make any sacrifices to achieve
the objectives he shares with others. There is accordingly no
presumption that large groups will organize to act in their common
interest.”95 In short, it is likely that people did not believe the pain was
worth the gain.
One interesting turn of events took place when the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) and other organizations started
to litigate more intensively against individuals who made illegal copies
of songs on the Internet. Unsatisfied by victories against the hosts of
peer-to-peer networking and other technologies that facilitate the illegal
copying of music files, the RIAA and related entities began pursuing
some of the individuals who engaged in copying.96 These lawsuits took
strategic advantage of the provisions in copyright law that allow courts
to award plaintiffs statutory damages in the amount of $750 to $150,000

92. See Manta, supra note 87, at 481–85.
93. Mary Jane Saunders, Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Copyright Felony Act,
71 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 675 (1994).
94. See Bell, supra note 91, at 781–84, 786 (attributing the expansion of copyright law in
part to an effective intellectual property lobby).
95. OLSON, supra note 3, at 166–67.
96. See, e.g., infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
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per infringed work.97 The Copyright Act of 1909 introduced statutory
damages to address cases in which damages were difficult to compute,98
but the law originally stated that they “shall not be regarded as a
penalty.”99 When the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed, however, it
omitted this language, which led some commentators and at least one
court to suggest that statutory sanctions took a more punitive nature at
that stage.100 During the debate over whether to pass the Digital Theft
Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999 and
approve its accompanying raise in both minimum and maximum
statutory sanctions, Representative Howard Coble spoke openly about
how the goal of increasing statutory sanctions was to “deter copyright
infringement.”101 It is clear that (1) these sanctions had come a long way
from being simply necessary tools in a world where determining
damages was so complex that prescribed sums would help, and (2) they
now contained a punitive aspect that sought to discourage future
wrongdoing.
Plaintiffs like the RIAA and their attorneys saw a unique opportunity
in the existence of statutory damages because it is easy to find
defendants who have downloaded or shared a significant number of
songs and have done so willfully.102 These do not tend to be cases of
97. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). For a discussion of statutory copyright damages, see
generally J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal FileSharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright
Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004) (discussing the large statutory awards that copyright
law permits and how most defendants choose to settle rather than face those large damages);
Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory Damage
Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53–63 (2009) (discussing whether
excessively large statutory damage awards in copyright cases are constitutional); Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009) (discussing the plaintiff’s option to receive an
award of statutory damages at any time before the final judgment in copyright cases).
98. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 97, at 446 n.22.
99. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 504
(2012)), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf.
100. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 97, at 460–61. But see generally H. Tomás
Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About US Copyright Law and Statutory Damages,
5 W.I.P.O.J. 76 (2013) (providing historical background on why the statutory sanctions may not
have become more punitive in 1976 despite this omission). Note that in some cases, lost profits
may potentially exceed statutory damages. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc.,
No. 07 Civ. 8822(HB), 2010 WL 3629587, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (awarding $6,585,000
where the judge estimated actual damages at $17,560,000).
101. 145 CONG. REC. 30,636, 30,785 (1999).
102. Willful infringement is, as one would intuitively expect, the type accompanied by the
highest statutory damages per infringed work. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (allowing up to
$150,000 in statutory awards). Some scholars have suggested, however, that the tripartite
structure that Congress created through the Copyright Act of 1976, which calibrated sanctions to
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accidental infringement of one work against another similar work;103
rather, defendants illegally download exact copies because they are free.
In one of the best-known cases of this kind, a federal district court
ordered a Minnesota woman named Jammie Thomas to pay $1.92
million in damages for the willful illegal sharing of twenty-four
copyrighted songs.104 After further procedural steps in the litigation, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit vacated the decision but
did order Thomas to pay $222,000,105 which remains an exorbitant sum
for an infringement that amounted to “the equivalent of approximately
three CDs, costing less than $54.”106 Some news outlets began referring
to her as the “download martyr” as a result.107 Another case involved
Boston University student Joel Tenenbaum, whom a federal district
court sentenced to pay $675,000 for illegally sharing thirty songs.108
After a protracted court battle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held that this sentence should stand and that it does not violate
Tenenbaum’s due process rights.109 Some may question why juries are
willing to award such large amounts if these amounts are out of step
with societal norms and expectations. Dan Kahan argues on this subject
that, up to a certain point, “the desire of most decisionmakers to carry
out their legal obligations is likely to dominate their personal
commitment to the norm.”110 While this phenomenon applies to both
the level of moral culpability of infringers, “has devolved into a regime in which the innocent
infringer provision is essentially never used, and willful infringement is commonly found in
cases when infringement should properly be deemed ordinary.” Samuelson & Wheatland, supra
note 97, at 460.
103. For a discussion of non-willful copyright infringement, see generally Irina D. Manta,
Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1331–36 (2012) (analyzing different tests for
determining whether a work is “substantially similar” and the problems that arise in applying
such a standard).
104. Greg Sandoval, Jammie Thomas Asks for New Trial, CNET (July 6, 2009, 3:28 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10280531-93.html.
105. Greg Sandoval, Appeals Court Sides with RIAA, Jammie Thomas Owes $222,000,
CNET (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:25 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57510453-93/appealscourt-sides-with-riaa-jammie-thomas-owes-$222000.
106. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (2008).
107. See, e.g., Nick Pinto, Jammie Thomas-Rasset: The Download Martyr, CITY PAGES
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.citypages.com/2011-02-16/news/jammie-thomas-rasset-thedownload-martyr.
108. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89 (D. Mass. 2009),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011).
109. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013). For a criticism
of the decision to impose such high sanctions against Tenenbaum in the name of societal
deterrence, see Wendy J. Gordon, The Lost Logic of Deterrence: When ‘Sending a Message’ to
the Masses Outstrips Fairness, COGNOSCENTI (July 11, 2013), http://cognoscenti.wbur.org/2013/
07/11/joel-tenenbaum-wendy-gordon.
110. Kahan, supra note 7, at 644.
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criminal and civil sanctions, it is especially true for civil cases.111
While juries were thus unwilling to nullify the laws that imposed
statutory sanctions, the public at large did not appreciate the fact that the
awards against Thomas and Tenenbaum far exceeded anything that the
single mother and the graduate student could afford to pay.112 Further,
Tenenbaum launched a public relations campaign to protest the situation
and created a website that distributes information about his case,
collects money to defray his costs, and gathers the stories of some of the
30,000 individuals who settled their cases with entertainment companies
for amounts between $3,000 and $12,000.113 Other cases involved the
RIAA suing defendants such as a family that did not own a computer, a
teenager,114 a homeless man,115 and a dead grandmother.116
In addition to the cases directly related to file sharing, around the
time of the SOPA/PIPA discussion, a high-profile story made the
rounds on the Internet about the threatened extradition to the United
States of a British college student named Richard O’Dwyer who ran a
website that posted links to pirated movies and TV shows.117 O’Dwyer
faced ten years in American jail for his activities, though he ultimately
111. See id. at 642 (explaining that decision makers “are likely to experience less aversion
to enforcing civil remedies, which tend to be milder both in their regulatory incidence and in
their social meaning; yet as they become accustomed to enforcing civil sanctions,
decisionmakers are likely to become progressively more condemnatory of the underlying
conduct and thus more supportive of punitive measures at a later time”). In the realm of criminal
sanctions, scholars have discussed how legislators must respect the principle of “fair labeling”
in an effective legal system that seeks to ensure compliance across various actors. This means
that laws must signal the distinctions between both different types of offenses and
their magnitudes. See, e.g., STUART P. GREEN, 13 WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 52–54 (2012) (discussing fair labeling and the law’s obligation to “punish
the more blameworthy act more severely and the less blameworthy act less severely”). For
another take on the issue of gradations in the law, see generally Adam J. Kolber, Smooth
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
and Bumpy Laws, 102
CAL.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992034.
112. See Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1265 (noting the “public
sentiment that the awards are disproportionate and excessive”).
113. JOEL FIGHTS BACK, available at http://archive.is/2G6Rg (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
For a brief history of these types of cases, see Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note
42, at 1259–63.
114. Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues Computer-Less Family, 234 Others, for File Sharing, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2006, 2:47 PM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2006/04/6662-2.
115. Jamie Lendino, RIAA Sues Homeless Man, After Deciding Dead Grandmother Wasn’t
Enough, SOCIAL TIMES (Apr. 21, 2008, 11:24 AM), http://socialtimes.com/riaa-sues-homelessman-after-deciding-dead-grandmother-wasnt-enough_b1662.
116. Eric Bangerman, “I Sue Dead People...,” ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 4, 2004, 4:43 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/02/4587-2.
117. Peter Walker, ‘Piracy’ Student Loses US Extradition Battle over Copyright
Infringement, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jan/13/
piracy-student-loses-us-extradition.
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struck a deal in November 2012 to avoid both extradition and jail
time.118 The O’Dwyer saga added to the perception that the media
companies have a lot of power and can reach even individuals abroad
who may not have violated their own local laws.119
Due to a number of factors including the suffering public relations
image of entertainment companies as a result of such lawsuits, which
this Article analyzes further in Section II.B, and the large amounts spent
on legal fees versus sums recovered,120 the record companies decided to
mostly cease their legal efforts. At one point, these companies set up a
settlement website. The goal of the site was for college students who
infringed copyright laws whose universities disclosed their information
and for users whose data was revealed by Internet service providers to
enter into settlements for a few thousand instead of hundreds of
thousands of dollars.121 At the time of this writing, that website is no
longer functional,122 and questions remain as to whether the
entertainment companies have genuinely forsaken the initiation of new
cases.
B. The Public’s Reaction to Copyright Enforcement and to Varying
Levels of Sanctions
Historically, intellectual property laws were not a subject that
angered much of the population. There were occasional battles on the
subject, but most of them took place on a fairly small scale.123 The
subject became truly heated when America turned into a “nation of
118. Dasha Afanasieva, UK Student Escapes U.S. Extradition in Copyright Case, REUTERS
(Nov. 28, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/28/net-us-britain-usatvshack-idUSBRE8AR0VE20121128.
119. See Walker, supra note 117 (discussing that according to his lawyers, O’Dwyer’s
website acted as little more than a “[G]oogle-type search engine”); see also Somini Sengupta,
U.S. Pursuing a Middleman in Web Piracy, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/technology/us-pursues-richard-odwyer-as-intermediary-inonline-piracy.html (noting the entertainment industry’s stringent effort to pass SOPA).
120. Ray Beckerman, Ha Ha Ha Ha Ha. RIAA Paid Its Lawyers More Than $16,000,000 in
2008 to Recover Only $391,000!!!, RECORDING INDUSTRY VS THE PEOPLE (July 13, 2010, 11:26
AM), http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2010/07/ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-riaa-paid-its-lawy
ers.html.
121. See Eliot Van Buskirk, A Poison Pen from the RIAA, WIRED (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://archive.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/02/72834 (discussing the settlement
process).
122. Attempts to access any content at http://www.p2plawsuits.com failed (last visited Feb.
26, 2014).
123. For one example of an early intellectual property conflict, see Adam Mossoff, The
Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53
ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 165–66 (2011) (analyzing the history of an early patent thicket on sewing
machine parts).
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constant infringers.”124 The RIAA warns that in the decade after peerto-peer file sharing began with Napster in 1999, music sales in the
United States dropped 47% from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion, that from
2004 through 2009, individuals illegally downloaded 30 billion songs
on file-sharing networks, and that only 37% of the music Americans
acquired in 2009 was legally purchased.125 The RIAA also notes that
even though peer-to-peer downloading remained flat over the last few
years, the use of digital storage lockers to spread illegal music files
increased.126 Other actors greatly question the economic effects of
illegal downloads, and a recent report argues that increases in creation
and revenues exist in virtually every sector of the entertainment
industry.127
With the rise in lawsuits by organizations like the RIAA, every
American that engaged in illegal file sharing—at least 27% of all
Internet users as of 2005, based on self-reports likely to underestimate
the true figure128—became a potential target of hefty sanctions. Some
studies set the figure of the percentage of the population that purchases,
copies, or downloads unauthorized music, TV shows, or movies at 46%,
and as high as 70% among 18–29 year olds.129 Had the pattern remained
one of nonenforcement or of low sanctions, it is very unlikely that the
public would have mustered the same level of outrage as it did over
Jammie Thomas’s, Joel Tenenbaum’s, and related cases. Observers
would have probably both felt less empathy for the defendants of low124. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543.
INDUS.
ASS’N
AM.,
125. For
Students
Doing
Reports,
RECORDING
http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
126. Id. A recent study suggests that the amount of Internet bandwidth used for illegal
downloads increased by 160% between 2010 and 2012. Richard Verrier, Online Piracy of
TIMES
(Sept.
17,
2013),
Entertainment
Content
Keeps
Soaring,
L.A.
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-fi-ct-piracy-bandwith-20130917,0,1
550997.story.
127. MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, FLOOR 64, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK
AT
THE
STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 4 (2012), available at
http://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising. Additionally, 2012 apparently set a box-office record for
Hollywood movies. Scott Bowles, A Happy 2012 for Hollywood as It Sets Box-Office Record,
USA TODAY (Dec. 26, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2012/
12/25/box-office-christmas-avengers/1790601.
128. MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSIC AND VIDEO
DOWNLOADING MOVES BEYOND P2P 1 (2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/
media/Files/Reports/2005/PIP_Filesharing_March05.pdf.pdf.
129. JOE KARAGANIS, AM. ASSEMBLY, COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT IN
THE
US, 2 (Nov. 2011), available at http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/AA-Research-Note-Infringement-and-Enforcement-November2011.pdf.
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sanctions cases and been less concerned about the issue from a selfinterested point of view. Even though the copyright owners could argue
that they were simply exerting their rights, the public viewed such
enforcement as an unjust power dynamic and saw the settlements as
characteristic of blackmail or harassment that lacked legitimacy,
resulted in random enforcement, and entailed disproportionate and
excessive awards in court.130
But the RIAA had a number of reasons not to want low sanctions, as
it believed that these would not provide the same type of large-scale
deterrence it envisioned from high sanctions and because recovering
low sanctions from each suit would have done even less to offset the
significant legal costs that the organization incurred with each suit.
While the RIAA was mostly unable to realize its goals, its position at
the time held some intuitive appeal to its members in light of the level
of financial investment that each lawsuit represented. Ben Depoorter
and his coauthors studied the matter and found that high sanctions
generated the greatest amount of backlash against copyright owners
even if subjects were indeed less likely to download if faced with high
sanctions and a low probability of getting caught as opposed to low
sanctions and a high probability of getting caught.131 It appears that
study subjects who qualified as frequent downloaders were the most
sensitive to high sanctions both in terms of behavioral measures and
their expressed intention to increase their downloading if given an
opportunity to do so in a risk-free manner.132 Annemarie Bridy notes
that, as Depoorter and his coauthors’ study suggests, the fear of
lawsuits indeed did not lead to a linear decrease in actual illegal
downloading behaviors after an initial dip, the reason being that the
threat of litigation “[rang] hollow for the millions of file sharers
who continued to share copyrighted material without permission (or
reprisal).”133 Part of the problem is the disconnection between norms
and the law, and the fact that harsh enforcement tactics can encourage
distaste against copyright altogether and prove counterproductive in the
quest to decrease infringement.134 This issue is likely to be exacerbated
130. Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1265–66.
131. Id. at 1281–83.
132. Id. One of the difficult choices that the entertainment industry has had to make is
whether to pursue only the largest-scale offenders (thus drawing less disapproval but reducing
overall deterrence) or a cross section of offenders, which attracts more controversy. Id. at 1283–
84.
133. Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in the Decade
After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 604 (2009).
134. See Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against
Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1158, 1161 (2005) (warning against the danger of
“strong-armed enforcement tactics”); see also Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note
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by the fact that 83% of teenagers between thirteen and seventeen years
of age believe that there is nothing morally wrong with file sharing.135
Generally speaking, whether a person complies with a law is greatly
influenced by not only whether the penalty for breaking the law is high
or low, but also whether she agrees with the law.136 At the same time, a
person’s perceptions about the threat of sanctions can change depending
on whether the person actually engages in the criminal activity and what
the consequences of those crimes are.137 One study of high school
students found that whether he was caught in the past himself and
whether his peers were caught for their behavior influenced an
individual’s beliefs about his future likelihood of being caught for a
crime.138 Both this study and others like it tend to confirm the
deterrence theory of punishment.139 The combination of knowledge
42, at 1280 (noting that “[r]aising the level of both severity and certainty of enforcement
produced a potentially powerful counterproductive effect”). Years before these particular IP
battles, Professor Tom Tyler stated that “reliance upon threats of punishment to enforce
intellectual property laws is a strategy that is likely to be ineffective.” Tom R. Tyler,
Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 219, 234 (1996–97). Other countries have shared some of these experiences, with a
backlash finally leading to a legislative change in France that removed the sanction of cut-off
Internet access after three instances of copyright infringement. See Stephen Shankland, French
Three-Strikes Law No Longer Suspends Net Access, CNET (July 10, 2013),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57593000-93/french-three-strikes-law-no-longer-suspends-n
et-access/?part=rss&subj=news&tag=readMore. See generally Rebecca Giblin, Evaluating
Graduated Response, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 147 (2014) (criticizing the international lack of
success of graduated responses to copyright infringement).
135. Steve Hanway & Linda Lyons, Teens OK with Letting Music Downloads Play,
GALLUP (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/9373/teens-letting-music-downloadsplay.aspx.
136. See Caroline Virginia Anderson, Are Fines Fine? A Mixed Methods Study of the
Effectiveness of and Attitudes to Overdue Fines Among Various Borrower Groups (Age,
Gender, Ethnicity, Student Status, Faculty and Degree) of the University of Canterbury Library
(June 2008) (unpublished M.L.I.S. thesis, Victoria University) (on file with Kelburn Library,
Victoria University of Wellington), available at http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/files/news/
AndersonCINFO580ResearchReport.pdf (discussing the extent to which fines deter library book
borrowers from keeping books past their due dates). For a discussion of the relationship between
criminal law and the average individual’s perceptions of justice, see Paul H. Robinson, Why
Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative
Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1839–40 (2000) (arguing that the credibility of a criminal
code depends on the public’s perception of its level of justice).
137. Greg Pogarsky et al., Modeling Change in Perceptions About Sanctions Threats: The
Neglected Linkage in Deterrence Theory, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 343, 364–65
(2004).
138. Id. at 364–66.
139. See id.; accord Ross L. Matsueda et al., Deterring Delinquents: A Rational Choice
Model of Theft and Violence, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 95, 100–03 (2006) (noting that a person
generally makes rational choices based on the risk of arrest as derived from prior perceptions
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from these studies and from Depoorter and his coauthors’ work suggests
the following: the decision to infringe could vary depending on the
salience of the risk of being caught and experiencing high sanctions,
and this salience was increased in the Depoorter study compared to the
real world where individuals only occasionally encounter stories of
enforcement. Indeed, while cases like Thomas’s and Tenenbaum’s may
be enough to stir outrage, when it comes to individual behavior, these
stories could prove insufficient to overcome the fact that most people do
not know even one person who has ever been in trouble for
unauthorized file sharing. The probability of being caught for file
sharing may, for better or for worse, be perceived as so low by many
people that they will continue to flaunt the law.
Many people follow laws because “it is the right thing to do.”140 This
preexisting belief, plus the costs and benefits of abiding by a specific
law, affect the effectiveness of the law and its enforcement. People
frequently disobey a law if it conflicts with their beliefs of what is just
and legitimate.141 In fact, an excessive sanction can reaffirm a person’s
belief that the law is unjust or a lawmaker is illegitimate142 and may
encourage a person to engage in the illegal behavior even more because
of its conformance with the individual’s own normative beliefs.143
When the law no longer has a deterrent effect, lawmakers may create or
increase sanctions or may give up on the law or its enforcement.144 This
all fits well with what one can observe in the context of unauthorized
file sharing: people have some degree of fear of getting caught after
they read about high-profile cases like Thomas’s or Tenenbaum’s, but
they then experience a reduction in fear as time goes by and as they
focus more on the benefits of file sharing again. This is especially true if
they do not have moral qualms about file sharing because they do not
see it as hurting anyone and because they may believe that the
politicians who passed the laws were in the pockets of the entertainment
companies.145
and new information regarding his own arrest or that of his peers, from subjective expected
psychic rewards, and from perceived opportunities).
140. Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1268.
141. Id. See generally EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY
OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP
(2010) (describing the way that violators can improve property and intellectual property laws).
142. Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 42, at 1269.
143. Id. at 1270.
144. Stuntz, supra note 33, at 1878.
145. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that in the patent context, the lobbies of the large IT
and pharmaceutical companies “have a strong influence on the voting behavior of
congresspersons, and they have a real influence on the direction of patent reform.” Jay P. Kesan
& Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1385
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Matters reached a breaking point between copyright owners and the
public when congressional legislators introduced a set of bills whose
goal was to further crack down on Internet-related intellectual property
offenses. 2011 saw the proposal of the Stop Online Piracy Act
(SOPA)146 in the House of Representatives and of the Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act (PIPA, also known as the PROTECT IP Act)147 in the
Senate, both of which were put on hold indefinitely after wide-spread
opposition.148 These bills included provisions that secured the ability to
obtain (1) court orders to prevent advertisers and banks from financially
dealing with infringing websites as well as (2) court orders that could
force Internet Service Providers to block access to websites or force
search engines such as Google and others to block links to websites that
infringe copyright laws.149 SOPA also added criminal sanctions for the
illegal streaming of copyrighted works, with penalties rising up to five
years’ imprisonment.150 The bills received criticism from numerous
quarters, such as from intellectual property scholars who criticized the
“potentially disastrous consequences for the stability and security of the
Internet’s addressing system, for the principle of interconnectivity that
has helped drive the Internet’s extraordinary growth, and for free
expression.”151
Scholars were not the only ones up in arms, however. As one
commentator put it:
[T]he rebels detonated their nuclear option. Wikipedia and
Reddit, along with other popular websites, went black,
generating thousands of calls and millions of emails, many
from constituents who had likely never heard of the
(2009). It is reasonable to infer that politicians are more likely to succumb to the pressures of
lobbyists on issues that are of little interest to most citizens, which is traditionally the case for
patents and, until recently, copyright. Meanwhile, citizens may respond by partially ignoring the
outcomes of lobbying and violating the resulting laws. See Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash,
supra note 42, at 1270 (explaining that “violating an unjust or immoral law might sometimes
increase utility to an individual, perhaps sufficiently so that it outweighs the costs associated
with the illegal behavior”). There is also the danger that such unjust laws will create subcultures
of offenders whose community bonds are counterproductively strengthened when the judicial
system pursues offenders. Id. at 1286.
146. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
147. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
148. See Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-postponespiracy-vote.html.
149. See H.R. 3261 § 102(c)(2)(A)–(D); S. 968, § 3(d)(B)–(D).
150. See H.R. 3261 § 201(a); see also 18 U.S.C. 2319(b)(1) (2006).
151. Mark Lemley et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 34 (2011).
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legislation the day before. Online petitions picked up
10,000,000 signatures, members of Congress received
3,000,000 emails and a still-unknown number of phone
calls. Thirty-four Senators felt obliged to come out publicly
against the legislation. That night, all four Republican
candidates condemned the bills during a televised debate.152
The demise of SOPA and PIPA certainly did not signify an end to the
powerful lobbying forces in intellectual property.153 Indeed, the
breakdown of the traditional unity among copyright owners accelerated
the downfall of the bills,154 and Silicon Valley provided a real opponent
to the entertainment industry for the first time.155 Regardless, even
scholars who view the public choice framework as powerful agree that
the role that the technology companies play does not tell the whole
story.156 Rather, “[w]hile there was plenty of traditional interest group
politics at work here, the big story . . . was the great awakening of
Internet users.”157
So why did this call to action rise when SOPA/PIPA explicitly did
not seek to change the contours of substantive intellectual property law?
The harshness of the sanctions involved, set against a backdrop of the
content industries’ recent history of causing the imposition of other
harsh sanctions against the likes of Thomas and Tenenbaum, partly
caused this activism. To the extent that one considers the many
successful previous expansions of the scope and duration of copyright
to have resulted in suboptimal laws,158 however, concerns remain that
152. Larry Downes, Who Really Stopped SOPA, and Why?, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2012, 1:15
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/01/25/who-really-stopped-sopa-and-why.
153. For a discussion of the history and role of public choice factors in copyright
lawmaking, see generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68
OR. L. REV. 275 (1989).
154. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
155. Yochai Benkler, Seven Lessons from SOPA/PIPA/Megaupload and Four Proposals on
Where We Go from Here, TECHPRESIDENT (Jan. 25, 2012), https://techpresident.com/
news/21680/seven-lessons-sopapipamegaupload-and-four-proposals-where-we-go-here; see also
David Post, What the Hell Happened? The Campaign Against (and Defeat of) SOPA, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/17/happened-bringsopas-downfall (analyzing the factors that led to the downfall of SOPA).
156. See supra note 155; see also Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and the Public
Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering 1–2 (Aug. 19, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2131865.
157. Downes, supra note 152; see also Benkler, supra note 155; Lev-Aretz, supra note
156. One news article mused that the SOPA/PIPA incident “quite possibly ushered in a new age
of Web activism.” Doug Gross, The Top 10 Tech ‘Fails’ of 2012, CNN (Jan. 4, 2013, 5:21 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/28/tech/web/tech-fails-2012/index.html.
158. There have been critical empirical examinations, for instance, of whether increases in
scope or sanctions truly lead to increased creativity as the traditional copyright incentives story
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the popular uprising during the SOPA/PIPA battle may not fully
translate to future intellectual property contexts. Individuals’
willingness and ability to expend emotions and resources on political
issues is limited. Hence, even with the many additional resources
available for political activism, such as social networking,159 the next
bill that proposes an extension of copyright terms or proposes new
sanctions for existing violations may not lead to the same kind of
mobilization. The lower the sanctions that bills carry, the more likely
they are to slip through the cracks.
Relatedly, the fact of the matter is that individuals’ views on what is
ethical in the punishment of copyright offenses is directly tied to the
level of sanctions imposed. While, in a survey on Internet use and
copyright infringement, “[v]ery few think it is reasonable to upload
copies to websites where anyone can download them (16%), post links
to illegal copies on websites such as Facebook (8%) or sell illegal
copies (6%),”160 only 52% believed that individuals should ever face
punishment for downloading illegal songs or movies on websites or
through file-sharing services.161 Among the people that supported
penalties, the vast majority supported warnings and fines, but a bit
fewer than half wanted limitations on speed or functionality of Internet
service and just about a quarter supported disconnecting offending users
altogether; only 20% supported jail time.162 Of the 16% of the overall
surveyed population that supported disconnection, over half favored
periods that were either less than a month (25%) or less than a year
(34%).163 Of the people who approved of fines, 75% limited that
support to amounts under $100, which is significantly below the current
statutory penalties for copyright infringement.164
Not only were individual opinions thus calibrated to the specific
level of punishment, but they were also strongly swayed depending on
argues. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An
Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73, 1704 (2009)
(noting that laws increasing criminal penalties had an effect on creativity, as measured by the
number of copyright registrations in a given time period, only in six out of twenty-three
instances, four of which were increases and two decreases); MASNICK & HO, supra note 127, at
2, 4 (showing that the entertainment industry made great economic strides despite the existence
of large-scale copyright infringement).
159. See Lev-Aretz, supra note 156, at 4–5.
160. KARAGANIS, supra note 129, at 5.
161. Id. at 6.
162. Id. Of course, this meant that—viewing the entire surveyed group rather than just
those in favor of penalties—only half support warnings and fines of any sort, 28% support limits
on Internet use, and only 16% approve of disconnection from the Internet for individuals (and
over half of this 16% would refuse to support disconnection if it extended to households). Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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how the survey questions were phrased,165 particularly when the
questions gave the sense that blocking infringement was “easy” as
opposed to “messy.”166 This likely suggests that the particular portrayal
of copyright issues in the media may have an especially significant
influence on individuals’ perceptions and willingness to take political
action. The landscape of Americans’ opinions may have compounded
the effect of the media to reinforce people’s biases toward identifiable
victims and away from statistical ones in the copyright context. The
high sanctions against Thomas, Tenenbaum, and others, and the stories
of extradition tied to copyright infringement, as pitted against an
entertainment industry that may or may not suffer real economic harm
depending on whose empirical data one believes, created identifiable
victims out of the copyright infringers. The introduction of SOPA/PIPA
unleashed the public’s wrath because it combined high sanctions with a
degree of individual fear of the possible consequences. If statutory
damages could affect a mom in Minnesota or a student in
Massachusetts, might SOPA/PIPA’s sanctions not also have an impact
on any other average individual?167
In a sense, one could view the SOPA/PIPA battle as a public success
and as evidence that perhaps low sanctions are not so disastrous if a
backlash can halt their increase. The story of low sanctions is, however,
more complicated than that. First, we see in many areas, such as the
example of drug laws that this Article discusses above,168 that the public
can become unwilling or unable to stop increases in sanctions even if,
by most accounts, these implicate more harm than good and even if the
public would not have deemed the increased sanctions acceptable upon
passage of the initial bills.169 Second, focusing on copyright alone,
165. Naturally, the ability of survey questions to influence responses is a well-known
phenomenon not limited to this context.
166. KARAGANIS, supra note 129, at 10.
167. One could argue that this may show only that while the public finds the making of
unauthorized copies on the Internet unjust and favors low sanctions, it does not support high
sanctions. Even if that is the case, the question becomes whether the public would have agreed
to laws against such copying if it had known how large the sanctions would later grow and how
difficult it would be to stop that growth. It is far from certain that society would have entered
this bargain.
168. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
169. That being said, there are situations in which a society and its legislature see the need
to raise sanctions if the initial low ones are not as effective as legislators initially believed. My
statement refers specifically to situations in which the public, even with the benefit of hindsight
about the effect of the low sanctions, would not agree to go back and pass the bill with higher
sanctions if it could. There is no fail-proof method to ascertain whether an increase in sanctions
stems from legitimate policy reasons versus phenomena such as lobbying. Some of the ways to
protect against the latter are initial skepticism toward any increases, thorough discussion in the
media and other public forums, and inquiries into the extent to which the general public or, in
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while the SOPA/PIPA legislation was stopped, the sanctions previously
imposed against Thomas, Tenenbaum, and others remain. Also, the high
statutory sanctions of copyright stay on the books without clear
empirical backing and with easily observable potential harms. The
SOPA/PIPA battle harnessed highly specific forces whose presence
cannot be assumed in future copyright contexts that have a bit less
pervasive yet still important repercussions.
Indeed, some do not view it as a coincidence that the federal
government cracked down on the file-sharing site Megaupload just one
day after the most significant demonstrations against SOPA, especially
given that there is
a large number of functionaries throughout the federal
government, most importantly the Justice Department’s
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, a White
House IP czar, and an IPR Center housed in the
Department of Homeland Security, whose professional
success, irrespective of the policy position of any given
administration, [is] measured by (a) how threatening we
think Piracy is, and (b) how many large prosecutions they
are able to bring.170
In January 2012, the Department of Justice (DOJ) both shut down and
seized Megaupload assets in Hong Kong and New Zealand and caused
some of the individuals who ran the site to spend a month in prison
abroad and live under threat of extradition to the United States, all under
a theory of contributory copyright infringement that many
commentators malign.171 Not only did the Megaupload enforcement
occur right after the SOPA protests, but questions also exist about the
relationship between Aaron Swartz’s activism against SOPA and the
DOJ’s decision to prosecute him harshly.172
some situations, experts agree with the proposed measures. All of this militates for a significant
period of time that should normally pass between when a sponsor first introduces a bill that
involves a sanction increase and when it receives a vote, given that the dangers of crisis
legislation could overshadow careful consideration and lead to temporary outliers in what
constitutes average public opinion. For the general hazards of crisis legislation, see Romano,
supra note 9.
170. Benkler, supra note 155.
171. See id.; Toby Manhire, Kim Dotcom: The Internet Cult Hero Spoiling for a Fight with
US Authorities, GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/jan/
18/kim-dotcom-fight-internet-freedom; see also Eric Goldman, Comments on the Megaupload
Prosecution (a Long-Delayed Linkwrap), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2012, 9:30
AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/04/megaupload.htm (doubting that the U.S.
government has a case at all due to repeated legal mistakes).
172. See infra Section II.C.
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C. The Prosecution and Death of Aaron Swartz
No account of the role of sanctions in the world of intangible
property would be complete without an analysis of the high-profile case
of computer coder and Internet activist Aaron Swartz.173 A technology
prodigy, Swartz became involved in the development of the RSS
standard in his teens and later contributed to the formation of Reddit,
the Creative Commons project, and OpenLibrary.org.174 It appears
largely undisputed that in 2011, Swartz sought to provide the public
with free access to subscription-only articles in the academic database
JSTOR.175 He broke into computer networks at M.I.T. by leaving a
laptop hooked up to the system in a utility closet, signing in under a
false account and downloading 4.8 million documents that he planned to
release before law enforcement officials thwarted him.176 Prosecutors
initially charged him with four, but later with a total of thirteen criminal
counts,177 and according to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Aaron Swartz
theoretically “face[d] up to 35 years in prison, to be followed by three
years of supervised release, restitution, forfeiture and a fine of up to $1
million.”178 According to statements that prosecutors allegedly made to
his defense attorneys, Swartz’s actual prison sentence was likely to be
in the ballpark of seven years if a court convicted him.179 The charges
173. By way of clarification, this Article’s decision to include a section on Aaron Swartz
should not be construed as a sudden endorsement of an excessive focus on individual instead of
statistical victims in the making of public policy. Rather, this Article uses his tale to exemplify
the power of individual stories as a historical matter and it expresses skepticism as to how
society ignores the potential plight of lesser-known people in similar prosecutions. See infra
note 187 and accompanying text.
174. Kevin Poulsen, Aaron Swartz, Coder and Activist, Dead at 26, WIRED (Jan. 12, 2013,
4:01 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/aaron-swartz.
175. Of the 4.8 million documents, 1.7 million normally required payment to be accessed.
Charles Arthur, Reddit Co-Founder Accused of Stealing 4.8m JSTOR Documents from MIT,
GUARDIAN (July 19, 2011. 1:56 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/19/redditfounder-swartz-jstor-accused.
176. John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaronswartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html.
177. Tim Cushing, US Government Ups Felony Count in JSTOR/Aaron Swartz Case from
Four to Thirteen, TECHDIRT (Sept. 18, 2012, 7:24 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20120917/17393320412/us-government-ups-felony-count-jstoraaron-swartz-case-four-to-thirtee
n.shtml.
178. Alleged Hacker Charged with Stealing over Four Million Documents from MIT
Network, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 19, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/usao/ma/news/2011/July/
SwartzAaronPR.html. Some others place that figure as high as fifty or more years in prison and
$4 million in fines. Cushing, supra note 177.
179. Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial
Discretion), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:34 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, Prosecutorial
Discretion],
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartz-
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consisted of two counts of Wire Fraud, five counts of Computer Fraud,
five counts of Unlawfully Obtaining Information from a Protected
Computer, and one count of Recklessly Damaging a Protected
Computer.180 On January 11, 2013, Aaron Swartz hanged himself in his
Brooklyn apartment, and his family and partner believe that the
prosecution and threat of a long prison term and large fines contributed
to his decision to end his life; they called his death “the product of a
criminal justice system rife with intimidation and prosecutorial
overreach.”181
Some commentators do not believe that the charges against Aaron
Swartz stood on firm legal ground,182 but others, including cybercrime
expert Orin Kerr, disagree.183 Regardless of this disputed issue,
however, a few points of consensus emerge among a majority of
commentators. One is that whether a law is just or unjust and imposes
high or low sanctions, prosecutors possess enormous power when they
decide not only whether to bring a case in the first place but also how
hard to push it.184 In the aftermath of Swartz’s death, some
commentators stated that criminal law has evolved such that many
part-2-prosecutorial-discretion. It is worth noting that for some types of defendants, “collateral
effects [of criminal law] are quite steep, attach very early, and are often irrevocable.” Baer,
supra note 86, at 1312.
180. Cushing, supra note 177.
181. Family and Partner of Aaron Swartz, Official Statement, SOUP (Jan. 12, 2013),
http://soupsoup.tumblr.com/post/40373383323/official-statement-from-the-family-and-partnerof; Aaron Swartz’s Father Says Reddit Co-Founder Was ‘Killed by the Government,’
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/aaronswartz-father-says-killed-by-government_n_2482646.html. The reasons for any suicide are
certainly complex, and there is no doubt that Swartz had preexisting struggles with depression.
See Laurie Segall, Activist Aaron Swartz’s Suicide Sparks Talk About Depression, CNNMONEY
(Jan. 14, 2013, 7:41 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/14/technology/swartz-suicidedepression/index.html.
182. See Max Kennerly, Examining the Outrageous Aaron Swartz Indictment for Computer
Fraud, LITIG. & TRIAL BLOG (July 19, 2011), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/
07/articles/series/special-comment/aaron-swartz-computer-fraud-indictment (arguing that the
charges against Aaron Swartz rest on a shaky legal basis); Mike Masnick, The Lack of a Legal
or Moral Basis for the Aaron Swartz Indictment Is Quite Troubling, TECHDIRT (July 20, 2011,
12:06 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110720/00581915173/lack-legal-moral-basisaaron-swartz-indictment-is-quite-troubling.shtml (responding to Kennerly’s analysis regarding
the charges against Aaron Swartz).
183. Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against Aaron Swartz (Part 1: The Law), VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2013, 2:50 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartzcharges. For a partial critique of Professor Kerr’s take, see James Boyle, The Prosecution of
Aaron Swartz: A Reply to Orin Kerr, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2013, 10:11 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-boyle/prosecution-aaron-swartz_b_2508242.html.
184. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Did Prosecutors Go Too Far in Swartz’s Case?, NPR (Jan.
15, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/15/169421636/did-prosecutors-go-too-far-inswartz-case.
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respectable people today likely violate it.185 Internet scholar James
Grimmelmann believes that he himself probably violated some of the
same laws as Swartz in the past when Grimmelmann engaged in a mass
download of his own old blog posts.186 While Orin Kerr thinks that the
charges against Swartz conformed to the law, he poignantly writes:
[T]he broader point is that if we think aggressive
prosecution tactics such as this are improper, we shouldn’t
be focused just on the Aaron Swartz case. Rather, we
should be shining a light on the federal criminal system in
its entirety. These sorts of tactics have been going on for
years, without many people paying attention. If we don’t
want a world in which prosecutors have these powers, we
shouldn’t just object when the defendant in the crosshairs is
a genius who went to Stanford, hangs out with Larry
Lessig, and is represented by the extremely expensive
lawyers at Keker & Van Nest. We should object just as
much—or even more—when the defendant is poor,
unknown, and unconnected to the powerful. To do
otherwise sends an extremely troubling message to
prosecutors that they need to be extra sensitive when
considering charges against defendants with connections.
We have too much of a two-tiered justice system already, I
think. So blame the system and aim to reform the system;
don’t think that this was just two or three prosecutors that
were doing something unusual. It wasn’t.187
185. See, e.g., Tim Wu, How the Legal System Failed Aaron Swartz—and Us, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/everyoneinteresting-is-a-felon.html.
186. James Grimmelmann, My Career as a Bulk Downloader, LABORATORIUM (Jan. 16,
2013, 12:43 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/01/16/my_career_as_a_bulk_downloader.
187. Kerr, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 179; see also Ian Bassin, In Remembering
Aaron Swartz, Let’s Not Forget Jamel Dossie, MORUM (Jan. 18, 2013, 12:01 PM),
http://themorum.blogspot.com/2013/01/in-remembering-aaron-swartz-lets-not.html (“Often it
takes a rare injustice perpetrated against a privileged young person for our society to recognize
the common injustices we visit every day upon less-privileged minorities.”); James
Grimmelmann, Comment to My Career as a Bulk Downloader, LABORATORIUM (Jan. 16, 2013,
9:48 PM), http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/01/16/my_career_as_a_bulk_downloader#comment70137 (“The treatment he received—using an insanely disproportionate sentence as a threat to
pressure him into accepting a sentence that is ‘only’ seriously disproportionate—is a standard
part of the prosecutorial toolkit.”). For proposals to rein in prosecutorial discretion in the
aftermath of Aaron Swartz’s and others’ legal cases, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham
Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is a Crime (Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 206, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2
203713.
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One of Kerr’s proposals to improve the situation in the area of
computer-related offenses is to amend the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (CFAA) to make it more difficult for an instance of suspected
unauthorized access to trigger felony liability.188 He has proposed
model language for such a statute,189 and the Electronic Freedom
Foundation (EFF) and others have suggested possible amendments to
that language.190 The time may indeed be ripe for a reexamination of the
CFAA, although some believe that society may experience a
counterproductive backlash against such efforts after the hacker group
Anonymous attacked the DOJ’s website and threatened to release
confidential information about Supreme Court Justices unless Congress
changes the way it handles sentencing and computer crime.191
Whether legislative alternatives succeed or not, Swartz’s story and
its sad ending provide further illustration for this Article’s claim that
sometimes it takes the threat of high sanctions—in this case in the form
of potential punishments for accumulated counts against a fairly wellknown individual who killed himself—to get the public’s attention and
put heft behind calls for legislative change.192 Aaron Swartz’s death
188. Kerr, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 179.
189. Orin Kerr, Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20,
2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/20/proposed-amendments-to-18-u-s-c-1030.
For a critique of the proposal, see Stewart Baker, A Dubious Proposal for Amending the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2013, 7:07 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/28/a-dubious-proposal-for-amending-the-computer-fraud-andabuse-act.
190. See Orin Kerr, Aaron’s Law, Drafting the Best Limits of the CFAA, and a Reader Poll
on a Few Examples, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 27, 2013, 11:46 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/27/aarons-law-drafting-the-best-limits-of-the-cfaa-and-a-readerpoll-on-a-few-examples-part-i (summarizing suggested changes and clarifying the effect of the
law in practice).
191. Stewart Baker, Anonymous Attacks Again, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 26, 2013, 1:39
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/26/anonymous-attacks-again; see also Jessica Meyers, Online Activists
Fret over Extremism, POLITICO (Jan. 31, 2013, 4:38 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/onlineactivists-extremists-hurt-cause-86963.html (“Supporters of online freedoms worry extreme acts may
thwart the momentum gained last year with the crushing defeat of anti-piracy legislation.”). Another
incident potentially linked to the revenge campaign of Anonymous on behalf of Swartz is the
hacking into the Federal Reserve that occurred shortly after his death. Charles Riley, Hackers
(Feb.
7,
2013),
Access
Federal
Reserve
Website,
Data,
CNNMONEY
money.cnn.com/2013/02/06/technology/federal-reserve-hack. Professor Eric Posner argues that
Aaron Swartz’s prosecution will ultimately help to promote open access policies. Eric Posner,
How Aaron Swartz’s Cause Wins in the End, SLATE (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/01/aaron_swartz_
beat_prosecutors_by_increasing_political_support_for_open_access.html.
192. It turns out that a few years ago, the same prosecutor that went after Swartz was
involved in a prosecution against another lesser-known hacker who also killed himself. See
Justine Sharrock, Internet Activist’s Prosecutor Linked to Another Hacker’s Death, BUZZFEED
(Jan. 14, 2013, 8:10 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/justinesharrock/internet-activists-
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drew bipartisan comments from members of Congress as well as led to
both a decision by House Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa
to investigate the prosecution193 and a public demonstration in New
York City.194 It also prompted an online petition to remove U.S. District
Attorney Carmen Ortiz from office for her role in Swartz’s prosecution,
a petition that quickly crossed the threshold of 25,000 signatures needed
to produce a response from the White House.195 Most recently,
Representatives Issa and Elijah Cummings wrote a letter to the Attorney
General “to request a briefing about the decisions by federal prosecutors
to bring criminal charges in 2011 and 2012 against Internet activist
Aaron Swartz.”196 The letter asks incisive questions such as “[w]hat
factors influenced the decision to prosecute Mr. Swartz for the crimes
alleged in the indictment, including the decisions regarding what crimes
to charge and the filing of the superseding indictment”;197 whether
Swartz’s association with SOPA or any advocacy groups influenced
these choices; how the prosecution made decisions in regard to plea
offers and sentencing proposals; and why the prosecution filed a
superseding indictment.198 When Attorney General Eric Holder faced
questions as to whether the Swartz case involved prosecutorial
overreach, he responded in the negative and stated that the relevant
factor was not “what necessarily was charged as much as what was

prosecutor-linked-to-another-h. Swartz’s attorney also accused the prosecutor, Stephen
Heymann, of exploiting cases like Swartz’s for his own publicity. Zach Carter, Aaron Swartz’s
Lawyer: Prosecutor Stephen Heymann Wanted ‘Juicy’ Case for Publicity, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 14, 2013, 4:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/14/aaron-swartz-stephenheymann_n_2473278.html.
193. Ryan J. Reilly et al., Darrell Issa Probing Prosecution of Aaron Swartz, Internet
Pioneer Who Killed Himself, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 6:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/darrell-issa-aaron-swartz-_n_2481450.html.
194. Clare Trapasso & Daniel Beekman, Crowd Mourns Reddit Founder Aaron Swartz,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2013, 1:01 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/friendsfamily-mourn-reddit-founder-article-1.1243444.
195. Betsy Isaacson, Petition to Remove Carmen Ortiz, Aaron Swartz Prosecutor, Reaches
Threshold for White House Response, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013, 1:44 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/petition-to-remove-carmen-ortiz_n_2479458.html;
see also Petition to Remove Prosecutor in Aaron Swartz Case up for White House Response, RT
(Feb. 13, 2013, 8:48 PM), http://rt.com/usa/news/swartz-prosecutor-petition-response-163
(discussing the petition and explaining that the petition threshold changed from 25,000 to
100,000 signatures shortly after Aaron Swartz’s death).
196. Letter from Darrell E. Issa & Elijah E. Cummings, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, to Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 28, 2013), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2013-01-28-DEI-EEC-to-Holder-re-Aar
on-Schwartz-prosecution.pdf.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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offered, in terms of how the case might have been resolved.”199
Suspicions run deep in many quarters that the DOJ sought to make an
example out of Swartz because he was a prominent figure who had
already angered the government by opposing SOPA and attempting to
provide free access to public court documents that normally involve
individual payments through the PACER system.200
Some, including Carmen Ortiz’s husband Tom Dolan, defended the
prosecutors’ actions and argued that the prosecution offered Swartz a
plea deal that involved only about six months in prison.201 One
commentator argues that prosecutors “go after defendants tooth and
nail, overcharging them from the abundance of criminal laws with
sentences so severe and out of proportion to the crime that, as now
happens in 95 percent of criminal cases, the prudent choice is to cop a
plea.”202 Most of those deals—and hence the stories of people who go to
jail or prison for six months here or six months there, which symbolizes
relatively low sanctions in the grand scheme of terms of imprisonment
despite the possible unfairness of some of those terms—never make it
into the news. Swartz is one of the few who refused to take that option.
While he worried about the prospect of prison, his greatest fear was to
be labeled a felon.203
199. Justin Peters, Eric Holder to Senate Judiciary Committee: Aaron Swartz Case Was “A
Good Use of Prosecutorial Discretion,” SLATE (Mar. 6, 2013, 12:49 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/03/06/aaron_swartz_eric_holder_calls_aaron_swartz_ca
se_a_good_use_of_prosecutorial.html (criticizing Holder’s attempt to decouple the charges
from the possible outcome).
200. See, e.g., Tim Carmody, Memory to Myth: Tracing Aaron Swartz Through the 21st
Century, VERGE (Jan. 22, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2013/1/22/3898584/
aaron-swartz-profile-memory-to-myth (describing Aaron Swartz’s life, accomplishments, and
the motivations behind his actions).
201. Prosecutor’s Husband Defends Push to Jail Internet Activist, BUZZFEED (Jan. 15,
2013, 7:20 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/buzzfeednews/prosecutors-husband-defends-pushto-jail-internet.
202. Lincoln Caplan, Aaron Swartz and Prosecutorial Discretion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18,
2013,
10:06
AM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/aaron-swartz-andprosecutorial-discretion; see also Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Draw Fire for Sentences Called
Harsh, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/us/federal-prosecutorsassailed-in-outcry-over-sentencing.html (discussing the criticism that “federal prosecutors are
strong-arming defendants into pleading guilty and overpunishing those who do not—
undermining the fairness and credibility of the justice system”). Given the power of prosecutors,
a further concern is the possibility that much prosecutorial misconduct and failure to turn over to
the defense exculpating evidence goes undetected. See Editorial, Rampant Prosecutorial
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/ra
mpant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html.
203. David Amsden, The Brilliant Life and Tragic Death of Aaron Swartz, ROLLING STONE
(Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-brilliant-life-and-tragic-death-ofaaron-swartz-20130215; see also Lawrence Lessig, Prosecutor as Bully, HUFFINGTON POST
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Did the drafters of the laws that Swartz allegedly broke envision
defendants like him? If so, were the laws’ sanctions calibrated properly
and did the laws account for the possibility of overzealous prosecutors?
Professor Lawrence Lessig and others have argued that thirty-five years
in prison would have been a very disproportionate punishment.204 If that
is the case, the DOJ’s press release touting this figure appears morally
dubious even if it was unlikely that a judge would have actually
sentenced Swartz to anything near that length of time.205 If the laws did
not envision defendants like Swartz, were the gains from those laws
sufficient to warrant the potential level of excess seen in some
individual cases like his? And, as a related matter, would Congress have
passed those laws had it realized that this is how they would be used?
Some of these questions are difficult to answer, whether in the abstract
or in particular cases, because Congress often does not explain its
actions, or different congressional actors may have digressing views and
motives. Further, some of the answers depend on the specific time
frame that one is examining. What is known is that the CFAA, which
prosecutors used in Swartz’s case, started off in 1986 as a criminal
statute meant to protect national security interests but was amended four
times since (including through the Patriot Act, which this Article
discusses above)206 to significantly expand its scope.207 Given the often
unavoidable expansion of scope of liability and the rise in sanctions for
offenses—driven by either later legislative increases of the sanction
levels or ambitious prosecutorial accumulation of criminal counts in
indictments—the Aaron Swartz story shows that bills about offenses in
the rapidly changing technological world of information appropriation
and dissemination may deserve particular scrutiny.

(Jan. 13, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/aaron-swartzsuicide_b_2467079.html (questioning the government’s need to press for felony charges against
Swartz). Swartz also likened his experience with the prosecution to the experience that Franz
Kafka describes in the novel “The Trial.” Amsden, supra.
204. See Lessig, supra note 203 (opining that the government overcharged Swartz for his
crime); Alex Stamos, The Truth About Aaron Swartz’s “Crime,” UNHANDLED EXCEPTION (Jan.
12, 2013), http://unhandled.com/2013/01/12/the-truth-about-aaron-swartzs-crime (stating that
Swartz’s illegal downloading did not merit thirty-five years in jail).
205. See Kerr, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 179 (discussing government press
releases’ tendencies to publicize maximum sentences, as opposed to the more realistic lower
sentence possibilities).
206. See supra Section I.A.
207. For a discussion of the evolution of the CFAA, see Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes &
Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
909, 912–17 (2003).
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D. Lessons
As shown in this Article, the phenomena that affect low sanctions
are not necessarily limited to information-related offenses. The
seemingly unique nature of copyright in the level of large-scale illegal
behavior that it currently entails is partially due to the historical
development of technology, but future development in addition to other
events could lead to a different set of targeted areas. The lessons from
the copyright context should make society reconsider its approach to
lawmaking if that occurs. Before legislators resort to criminalization,
caution is advised. Roberta Romano has proposed limitations to the
potential damage from ill-advised crisis-based financial regulation
through sunset requirements, among other measures.208 Perhaps we
need this or another novel approach to any expansions in criminal laws
(or civil laws likely to lead to criminal ones), at least at the federal level.
At a minimum, a legislator who faces the question of whether to support
a new law that carries low sanctions (law A) and is concerned that it
could lead to a less acceptable law with high sanctions (law B) for the
same offense
should consider all the mechanisms through which A might
lead to B, whether they are logical or psychological,
judicial or legislative, gradual or sudden. [She] should
consider these mechanisms whether or not [she] think[s]
that A and B are on a continuum where B is in some sense
more of A, a condition that would in any event be hard to
define precisely. [She] should think about the entire range
of possible ways that A can change the conditions—
whether those conditions are public attitudes, political
alignments, costs and benefits, or what have you—under
which others will consider B.209
This determination is complex and fraught with uncertainty, but it is
better to attempt it than to forsake it altogether.210 Along those lines,
208. See Romano, supra note 9, at 14.
209. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026,
1031 (2003) (footnote omitted). Volokh makes this point in the context of legal slippery slopes
generally, and he provides guidance throughout his article on how a proper analysis should
proceed. See id. Legislators must consider the cost of refusing to pass law A as well, including in
the context of the “broken windows” theory. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 59–89 (2001) (describing the theory while
rejecting its validity).
210. On a related note, David Schraub describes how at least some of the time, a
phenomenon termed “sticky slopes” occurs, which can have the opposite effect of slippery
slopes and lead a small legal reform to become an obstacle to a larger one. See David H.
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lawmakers should be wary of low-sanction laws that sponsors propose
as compromises between the people who do not wish to see any
sanctions and those who advocate for harsh ones, as “relatively
inconsequential measures might soften public resistance to much more
restrictive forms of regulation. Indeed, the sponsors of such laws, who
promote them . . . vehemently . . . , are no doubt banking on just this
effect.”211
Public reactions to future legislative proposals in copyright and other
areas that exhibit similar features will depend on many factors, but one
of them is likely to be the height of sanctions. This is true both because
stories of high sanctions will naturally raise more opposition in a public
whose views on copyright are acutely tuned to the level of sanctions and
because the high-sanction stories will more easily make their way into
the media in the first place. For legal scholars, this phenomenon raises
the importance of paying attention to the level of sanctions in bills and
discussing important laws accompanied by low sanctions that the media
may neglect. For the more interested members of the public (and this is
certainly true for other reasons as well), it increases the necessity of
seeking out information on policy topics outside of the mainstream
media. For journalists, the lesson may be that to the extent they
recognize the importance of particular pieces of legislation—be that
recognition for their immediate wide-spread effect albeit in the form of
low sanctions, or the likelihood that said sanctions will not stay low for
long—they should consider incorporating elements into their writing
that will attract a large readership despite the lack of an identifiable
victim who suffered a shockingly high sanction. This may involve
having journalists and other writers work on better ways to teach
readers about statistical information.212 Very popular books such as
Freakonomics213 have shown that, while challenging, the task is not
Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1249, 1252 (2013). Two situations in which this
could take place are if “prior victories exhaust the political will of representatives and their
constituents to support further efforts” or if “a particular high profile victory mobilizes
opponents, creating an effective cadre of political activists where none had previously existed.”
See id. at 1291, 1264. As to the latter point, like this Article discusses, few laws with low
sanctions will have that effect. As to the former issue, laws with low sanctions will generally be
insufficient to satisfy a group that has a high enough stake in the first place to engage in
activism over a particular political question. Schraub describes a number of settings in which his
thesis may hold, but these do not tend to be instances that involve sanctions, but rather ones
related to civil liberties. See id.
211. Kahan, supra note 7, at 643.
212. For an account of the importance of numeracy in the legal context, see generally
Arden Rowell & Jessica L. Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decisionmaking, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2163645.
213. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2005).
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impossible.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides some evidence that the law generally and
copyright law specifically contain risks tied to low sanctions. For the
reasons explained previously, hard empirical evidence is difficult to
gather, but the conclusions of this Article’s argument are unlikely to be
problematic even if the effect is smaller than anticipated. Anyone with
an interest in policy making should pay attention if legislators propose
new legislation that has low sanctions. Sanctions could rise over time,
or they could be widespread enough to cause significant damage. The
media and others are generally unlikely to intensely scrutinize
legislation accompanied by low-level sanctions. In copyright, the results
are evident from sanctions that have crept up and veered from merely
civil penalties to criminal ones. It took a combination of (1) high
sanctions, (2) the sudden realization that high sanctions could directly or
indirectly affect large portions of the population, and (3) efforts by
corporate entities, grassroots organizations, and individuals who used
the tools of social networking to stop the tide for the first time. This is
not the last occasion for expansion of substantive copyright law or of its
enforcement. To the extent that the public perceives any of these
expansions as inefficient or counterproductive, it must pay closer
attention in coming years, and advocates will have to find ways to
overcome the bias against the expenditure of energy when legislation
involves low sanctions. At times, policy makers will have to make
difficult decisions if a law may be just when it involves low sanctions
but become unjust as the sanctions rise; indeed, they may need to
predict how likely it is that sanctions will increase and whether the
perceived benefits of the initial legislation are larger than the possible
disadvantages down the road.
Future research on the psychological and practical effects of low
sanctions will likely yield important information not only to avoid
passing suboptimal laws but also to promote otherwise beneficial ones.
Different levels of sanctions will always attach a variety of social
meanings to the punished actions.214 At times, it is traditionally
understood, sanctions will signal that a behavior is unacceptable and
will deter its occurrence. At other times, however, the message will be
interpreted in a diametrically opposed way, such as was the case in a
day-care study where fines for parents late to pick up their children
214. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951
(1995) (defining social meanings as “the semiotic content attached to various actions, or
inactions, or statuses, within a particular context”).
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actually increased the occurrence of the behavior, perhaps because the
fines made such events seem more socially acceptable.215 The story of
the role of sanctions in shaping human behavior, including people’s
decisions to follow proper laws or oppose undesirable ones, remains
incompletely told for now. This Article provides just one step in
highlighting some of the remaining puzzles and showing that when it
comes to sanctions, everything may not be quite as it seems at first
glance.

215. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–15 (2000).
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